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ABSTRACT
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that better intelligence is needed for designing 
sound foreign policy. While good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, poor 
intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. Then, what are the essentials of good 
intelligence? How should intelligence agencies be organized? What can bring about 
reliable intelligence? To answer these questions two countries that are widely 
acknowledged to incorporate intelligence successfully into foreign policy making and 
implementation, namely the UK and the US, are examined in terms of the stmcture of 
their intelligence systems in support of foreign policy. Therefore answers to the questions 
of how their systems are organized, overseen and coordinated are sought in this study. 
Then a comparison between the UK and the USA, which are accepted to ha’>'e the highest 
standard in this respect, and the Turkish system is made in order to show differences 
between the systems. At the conclusion, based on findings from the comparison of the 
systems, recommendations are proposed to improve Turkish foreign intelligence 
capabilities.
IV
ÖZET
Başarılı bir dış politika için kaliteli ve güçlü bir istihbaratın gerektiği bu tezin ana 
argümanlarından biridir. İyi istihbarat her zaman için iyi bir dış politikayı garanti 
etmezken, kötü istihbarat sıkça yanlış politika üretimine sebep olur. O halde iyi bir 
istihbaratın esasları nelerdir? Nasıl bir istihbarat yapılanması başarılı bir dış politika için 
gerekli olan istihbaratı üretebilir? Bu soruları cevaplamak için, istihbaratı diş politikada 
başarılı bir şekilde kullanan iki ülkenin, Amerika ve İngiltere’nin, istihbarat 
yapılanmaları incelenmiştir. Bu ülkelerin istihbarat yapılanmalarınmın nasıl örgütlendiği, 
koordine edildiği ve denetlendiğinin cevapları aranmış, daha sonra da Türk istihbarat 
sistemiyle aralarında mukayese yapılmıştır. Sistemlerin kıyaslanmasından elde edilen 
verilerle de Türk istihbarat sisteminin daha da geliştirilmesi için bazı öneriler sonuçda 
verilmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION:
Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was insular and passive. Turkey 
focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that 
could divert it from that goal. Therefore Turkey did not need to collect foreign 
intelligence in any significant way. Instead it heavily relied on intelligence provided by 
NATO allies.
After the Cold War Turkey started to follow a more activist foreign policy. In 
joining the Gulf War coalition, Turkey broke several years of its long-standing silence. 
Since 1993, Turkish forces have participated in numerous peacekeeping, peace­
monitoring, and related operations, in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, Georgia, Hebron, 
Kuwait (the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission), Macedonia, and Pakistan (training 
Afghan refugees on mine clearing). As a re.sult of another Turkish initiative, several 
Balkan states agreed in September 1998 to set up a Balkan peacekeeping force to be 
deployed in NATO or WEU led operations sanctioned by the UN or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey also proposed a similar force for the 
Caucasus and a naval peacekeeping force for the Black Sea. In the Balkans, Turkey 
established working relations with all the states of the region. It developed close ties with 
Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. Disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed Turkey to 
exploit opportunities in the region. It has developed close ties with the Turkic states of 
the former Soviet Union.
Turkey cannot expect a continuation of intelligence-sharing of the past. It needs 
foreign/strategic intelligence tailored for its foreign, military, and economic policies. Is 
Turkey’s current intelligence system able to meet its above-mentioned needs? This study
is an attempt to identify the problems of Turkish intelligence structure in terms of 
providing support for foreign policy decision-making by comparing it with the UK and 
the US intelligence systems.
Intelligence is a relatively new subject in academic circles although it has been 
playing a great role in international affairs and foreign policy. Intelligence, therefore, is 
described as the “missing dimension” of the study of international relations. Among 
intelligence disciplines foreign intelligence is probably the broadest category, in that it is 
related to the defense of a countiy and the conduct of its foreign policy. Supporting 
diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers is usually a principal mission for foreign 
intelligence. This support includes providing advance warning of developments in other 
countries that will or could afl'ect a state's interests. Such advance warnings give 
policymakers the time to frame an appropriate response and, if possible, to avoid conflicts 
that might require the introduction of the state's forces. Foreign intelligence can also 
provide information that assist policymakers in determining which of several diplomatic 
steps may be most effective. Intelligence also plays crucial role in monitoring of treaties 
and other agreements.
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that better intelligence is needed for 
designing sound foreign policy. While good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, 
poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. Then, what are the essentials of 
good intelligence? How should intelligence agencies be organized? What can bring about 
reliable intelligence? To answer these questions two countries that are widely 
acknowledged to incorporate intelligence successfully into foreign policy making and 
implementation, namely the UK and the US, are examined in terms of the staicture of
their intelligence systems in support of foreign policy. Therefore answers to the questions 
of how their systems are organized, overseen and coordinated are sought in this study. 
Then a comparison between the UK and the USA, which are accepted to have the highest 
standard in this respect, and the Turkish system is made in order to show differences 
between the systems. At the conclusion, based on findings from the comparison of the 
systems, recommendations are proposed to improve Turkish foreign intelligence 
capabilities.
There are several reasons why the UK and the USA are chosen for comparison 
with the Turkish system. First of all, the systems of the UK and the USA are those that 
are mainly imitated and/or followed by many states in the world. Secondly, the type of 
the regime is important while organizing security and intelligence organizations. Turkey's 
regime, which is a parliamentary democracy, is similar to Western democracies. This is 
another reason why these two countries are selected to compare with the Turkish system. 
Thirdly, it might be said that the UK and the USA have set standards of intelligence both 
in academic and practical sense.
Turkey has been suffering from foreign policy failures. Answers to whether those 
failures could be explained by the lack of an appropriate intelligence system that the west 
operates by are also sought.
This study includes six chapters. Chapter 1 (What Is Intelligence?) is an attempt 
to provide the reader with a comprehensive but brief definition and explanation of 
intelligence and of related subjects. It also shows how broad the intelligence discipline is 
in contrast to perceiving intelligence as a tool of “dirty tricks” and subject of spy movies. 
The entire intelligence cycle and types of intelligence are explained in the chapter. Thus
the reader will have an understanding of intelligence right from the beginning of the 
thesis. There are many well-written sources on the subject. Information from major 
sources are compiled and redesigned. Chapter one is particularly important since the rest 
of the study is built around the terms provided in the chapter.
Chapter 2 (Intelligence and Foreign Policy) basically aims to explain why good 
intelligence is necessary to formulate a better foreign policy from a theoretical 
perspective. It summarizes briefly the importance of intelligence in foreign policy 
process, in models of foreign policy making, in foreign policy goals, and in foreign policy 
implementation. The relationship between the policy-maker and intelligence is also 
discussed. The factors influencing decision-makers’ attitudes toward intelligence, such as 
personal background, leadership style, politicizing intelligence, and setting priorities are 
explained.
Chapter 3 (The UK System) and Chapter 4 (The US System) are descriptions of 
the UK and the US systems. How these two intelligence communities are organized, 
coordinated and overseen in order to serve better their national defense and foreign policy 
is explained.
Chapter 5 (The Turkish System) deals with the Turkish intelligence community. 
The organizations in Turkish intelligence community are introduced briefly to the reader 
under the same headings in chapters 5 and 6. Thus the basic information to compare the 
systems is completed by the description of the Turkish system.
Chapter 6 (Comparison of the Systems) is new in the field. Even the Western 
sources lack comparative intelligence studies. Studies on comparative intelligence are 
limited only to articles and collected essays. However, none of them touches on
comparison of the Turkish intelligence system with any other state's intelligence system.
In the first section of chapter 6, three main areas of differences between the systems are 
discussed. Firstly, structure of intelligence communities, secondly the place given to 
foreign intelligence within the intelligence community, and lastly oversight and 
accountability of intelligence community are found to be the main differences between 
systems.
Chapter 6 also includes the conclusion of this study. Having explained, described 
and discussed main concepts (intelligence and foreign policy) and successful systems (the 
UK and the US systems), at the conclusion, recommendations drawn from the 
comparison of the systems are given to improve the Turkish system. How the Turkish 
intelligence system should be organized in order to serve better for the national defense 
and foreign policy is also discussed at the conclusion.
Writing about intelligence bears difficulties due to the nature of the business that 
intelligence involves. Most of the intelligence operations conducted in the past are still 
kept in secrecy. Only a small percentage of them is being declassified. Sources on 
intelligence operations are either declassified intelligence activities, such as Ultra and 
Magic, or the cases that were accidentally publicized due to scandals involved such as in 
the Iran-Contra Affair and the Bay of Pigs. Daily intelligence analysis and interaction 
within the government machinery are naturally secret. Therefore, while investigating the 
intelligence systems of the states this study follows the descriptive method.
There are vast amounts of American and British sources as well as Canadian on 
every aspect of intelligence. Most of the sources are so well organized and analyzed that 
a beginner does not have much to add on the literature. On the contrary the number of
open sources were not nearly enough for the Turkish system. Therefore, an analysis of 
the collected information was necessary. Hence, most of the emphasis was placed in 
writing the chapters 5 and 6, which required extensive analysis.
Due to the sensitivity of the subject, namely intelligence, a question may come to 
one's mind if any classified information is ever used, exposed, searched or put into the 
thesis. No classified material is used or exposed in this thesis. On the contrary, the 
foreign open material and sources were so abundant that a problem of scanning, reading 
and digesting the sources arouse.
CHAPTER 1 - WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?
Historical Background:
Intelligence was early recognized as a vital tool of statecraft of diplomacy or war. Writing 
almost 2500 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu stressed the importance of 
intelligence. His book The Art o f War gave detailed instructions for organizing an 
espionage system that would include double agents and defectors. Egyptian records 
indicate the extensive use of spies. Hanibal’s invasion of Italy (218 B.C.) during the 
Second Punic War was based on careful intelligence work, which included learning 
everything possible about the personal traits of the various Roman commanders. 
Intelligence, however, was properly organized by mlers and military chiefs during the 
rise of nationalism in the 18 century and the growing of standing armies and diplomatic 
establishments. In the 19"’ century Napoleon's strategy and tactics benefited from a 
comparatively modern intelligence system. The significant step in the creation of modern 
intelligence was the introduction of scientific methods of information analysis from a 
wide variety of sources. One of the first to do this was Wilhelm Stieber, the Prussian 
chief of intelligence under Chancellor Otto Von Bismarc. Intelligence has benefited 
immensely from technological progress.
Intelligence and the Academic World:
Although espionage and activities of secret services have long been of interest to the 
public and journalism, it is only since the mid-1970s that they have been objects of 
systematic academic research. The study of security and intelligence has developed as an 
inter-disciplinary field drawing upon contributions from history, political science, law, 
peace and defense studies and sociology. There are two main traditions within the field.
One is the historical approach, which mainly deals with the role of intelligence in time of 
war, and the other is the political science/international relations concern with intelligence 
policy. The former has been dominant in the UK while the latter has been more 
influential in the USA.’ During the past 25 years, serious research has been made on 
intelligence. Even two scholarly leading journals have been published for the last 10 
years. Jnielligence and National Security edited by Christopher Andrew and Michael 
Handel, is one primarily for historians. 7'he International Journal o f Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, edited by F. Reese Brown, is more for political scientists and 
intelligence professionals.^ Intelligence studies have become a recognized part of history 
and political science courses at universities and colleges in the United States, Canada and 
Britain. At the last count some 130 of them were identified at 107 institutions. In Britain, 
for instance, universities with intelligence courses and options include King's College 
London, Cambridge, Salford, Edinburg, Birmingham, Aberystwyt, St. Andrews and 
Aberdeen.^
Meredith Hindley, a PhD candidate at American University, has collected a list of 
dissertations currently being done on intelligence studies. She notes that "the work 
currently being done by graduate students on the history and practice of intelligence 
demonstrates how far intelligence studies has come in the past 25 years."'’ The list
' Michael Hennan, Inlelligence Power In Peace And JVar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. XI - XV.
 ^Earnest May, 'Studying imd Teacliing Intelligence' Studies in Inlelligence vol. 38 
no. 5 (1995), http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95imclas/may.htm
 ^Michael Herman, op. cit,. p. 2.
Meredith Hindley, 'First Annual List of Dissertations on Intelligence' Intelligence and National Security
vol. 13 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 208.
contains 54 entries from six countries. If a more organized attempt had been made, the 
number of entries in the list would have been much more. A survey of the dissertations 
suggests four main areas of interest. First, graduate students are taking a close look at the 
relationship between intelligence and policy making. Second, some of the dissertations 
explore the role of science and technology in advancing intelligence gathering techniques 
and ramifications for foreign policy, military planning, and civil-military relations. Third, 
questions are being asked about the role intelligence plays in influencing a government's 
perceptions of its allies and enemies, and implications for diplomatic and military affairs. 
Finally, some studies examine the effects of collaboration and competition between 
intelligence services and the impact on the success of operations.^
What Is Intelligence:
Definition of intelligence and related terms are important in order to provide a clear 
introduction to the subject. One of the experts in the field describes intelligence as the 
"information not publicly available, or analysis based at least in part on such information, 
that has been prepared for policymakers or other actors inside the government. What 
makes intelligence unique is its use of information that is collected secretly and prepared 
in a timely manner to meet the needs of policymakers.”*’ An intelligence operation is the 
process by which governments, military groups, business, and other organizations 
systematically collect and evaluate information for the purpose of discovering the 
capabilities and intentions of their rivals. With such information, or intelligence, an
' Ibid,.
Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future o f U.S. Intelligence Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, wvvw.copi.com/articles/lntelRpt/cfr.htnil
organization can both protect itself from its adversaries and exploit its adversaries' 
weaknesses.
In a broader meaning intelligence has to do with certain kinds of information, 
activities and organizations: Intelligence refers to "information relevant to a government's 
formulating and implementing policy to further its national security interests and to deal 
with threats to those interests from actual or potential adversaries."^ Intelligence activities 
or cycle includes collecting, analyzing (evaluation) and disseminating (utilization of) of 
data.* 
Intelligence work, including spying, proceeds in a five-step process. Initially, 
what the decision-makers need to know is considered, and requirements are set. The 
second step is collecting the desired information, which requires knowing where the 
information is located and who can best obtain it. The information may be available in a 
newspaper, radiobroadcast, or other open source; or it may be obtained only by the most 
sophisticated electronic means, or by planting an agent within the decision-making 
system of the target area. The third step is intelligence production, in which the collected 
raw data are assembled, evaluated, and collated into the best possible answer to the 
question initially asked. The fourth step is communicating the processed information to 
the decision-maker. To be useful, the information must be presented in a timely, accurate, 
and understandable form. The fifth and crucial step is the use of intelligence. The 
decision-maker may choose to ignore the information conveyed, thus possibly courting
 ^ Abraham N. Shulsky, SUent Warfare: Understanding The World O f Intelligence (New York; Brassey’s, 
Inc., 1993), p. 1.
* Amos Kovacs, ‘Using Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security vol. 12 no. 4 (October 1997). p. 
145.
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disaster; on the other hand, a judgment may be made on the basis of information that 
proves inaccurate. The point is that the decision-maker must make the final crucial 
judgment about whether or how, to use information supplied. The intelligence process 
can fail at each or any of these five basic steps.’
1.1. TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE:
Intelligence can be divided into two broad categories; the first category is classified 
according to the field intelligence activities involved: Security Intelligence, Foreign 
Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Commercial/Economic Intelligence, and Criminal 
intelligence. The second category is classified according to the methods that intelligence 
is collected; Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Open Source 
Intelligence.
1.1.1 Security Intelligence:
Security Intelligence - some prefer to call Domestic Intelligence*'^- deals with threats to a 
state's security and interest originating internally. Usually terrorist and spying activities 
inside the homeland are the main areas of concern for security intelligence. 
Counterintelligence activities that include measures to counter and prevent espionage 
activities run by hostile states constitute an important part of security intelligence. Most 
of the developed nations in the west have separate counterintelligence and security 
intelligence organizations, such as Germany's BfV, United States' FBI, Great Britain's
’ Ibid., pp. 145 -146.
Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., p. 4.
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MI5. Counterespionage utilizes some of the same methods as espionage itself. The best 
method of crippling an adversary's espionage program is by planting one's own agent (a 
"mole") into the hostile espionage organization. Another successful practice is to capture 
hostile spies and turn them into "double agents" that channel false information to their 
original employers.”
1.1.2. Foreign Intelligence:
"Foreign intelligence", alternatively named Slraiegic or National Intelligence, is defined 
as "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons. Foreign 
Intelligence usually encompasses national security, political, economic and social trends 
in the target nation.
Among intelligence disciplines foreign intelligence is probably the broadest 
category, in that it is related to the defense of a country and the conduct of its foreign 
policy in the widest sense. Supporting diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers is 
usually the principal mission for foreign intelligence. This support includes providing 
advance warning of developments in other countries that will or could affect a state's 
interests. Such advance warnings give policymakers the time to frame an appropriate 
response and, if possible, to avoid conflicts that might require the introduction of the 
state's forces. Foreign intelligence can also provide information that assists policymakers
II Ibid., p.
Blair Seaborn, ‘Intelligence and Policj'; What Is Constant? What Is Changing?’ Commentary No: 45 
June 1994. http://w\vw.csis-scrs.gc.ca/cng/cominent/com45c.html
12
in determining which of several diplomatic steps may be most effective. Intelligence also 
plays a crucial role in support of monitoring treaties and other agreements.
In short foreign/strategic intelligence encompasses two meanings: First, the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of information about global conditions -  especially 
potential threats to a nation’s security, and second, based on this information, the use of 
secret intelligence agencies to help protect the nation against harm and advance its 
interests abroad.
1.1.3. Military Intelligence:
Observing military activities of target nations as well as collecting information about 
their military force structure, military intelligence "could be either tactical; relating to the 
disposition of the enemy's troops and equipment in the field; or strategic, relating long 
term-capabilities in the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it."*^
The mission of military intelligence encompasses not only warning of attack on a 
state's territory and installations, but also providing information needed to plan and carry 
out military operations of all kinds. Supporting defense planning is another traditional 
mission of military intelligence. This mission entails providing information on foreign 
military capabilities in order that defense planners shape the size, nature, and disposition 
of military forces. It also includes necessary information to guide military research and 
development activities and future militai7 acquisition decisions. It encompasses
13 Ibid..
13
information about foreign militar}' tactics and capabilities, which can then be used to train 
and protect military forces.
1.1.4. Economic Intelligence:
Economic intelligence is described as "policy or commercially relevant economic 
information including technological data, financial, proprietary commercial and 
government information, the acquisition of which by foreign states could either directly 
or indirectly, assist the relative productivity or competitive position of the economy of the 
collecting organization's country."'^ Economic intelligence is related to the "capabilities 
and intentions of one's commercial rivals and competitors, often to the acquisition of 
confidential or proprietary information about their strategies, e.g., bid information, 
processes, finances or markets."
This activity focuses on those areas that could affect state's national interests, 
including the economies of foreign countries, worldwide economic trends, and 
information to support trade negotiations. While much of this information is available 
from public sources, there were many countries where such information was restricted or 
not readily available. Economic intelligence filled a considerable void.
Most large corporate enterprises today have divisions for strategic planning that 
require intelligence reports. Competitive enterprises are undeniably interested in the plans 
of their competitors; despite laws against such practices, industrial espionage is difficult 
to detect and control and is known to be an active tool to gain such foreknowledge. Many
14
15
Michael Herman, op. cit., pp. 16-19.
Samuel Porteous, 'Economic Espionage (II)' Coinmetilary, No; 46 July 1994. http://vv’ww.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/cng/comnienl/com46e.html
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of the tools of government intelligence work are used, including electronic surveillance 
and aerial photographic reconnaissance. Attempts are even made to recruit defectors. 
Recent examples of attempts to obtain economic information are as follows; in April 
1993, Hughes Aircraft decided not to participate in the Bourget Airshow after CIA 
warned the president of Hughes that his company was on a list of 49 American 
companies targeted by the French; China is reported to be using members of visiting 
delegations and exchanges to conduct economic espionage in the USA, Canada and other 
developed countries; business travelers were warned in 1992 not to fly Air France after it 
was discovered that the French intelligence service was bugging airline seats and using 
undercover agents to pose as airline passengers and flight attendants.’^
1.1.5. Criminal Intelligence:
Criminal intelligence applies to that which the police should know in order to counter and 
apprehend those engaged in organized crime, smuggling, extortion., terrorism and the 
like.’’ Criminal intelligence plays a major role in countering international organized 
crime. Intelligence focuses upon international organized crime principally as a threat to 
domestic interest, attempting to identify efforts to smuggle aliens into a state's territory, 
counterfeit currency, perpetrate fraud on financial institutions, or violate intellectual 
property laws. It also attempts to assess international organized crime in terms of its 
influence upon the political systems of countries where it operates.
Samuel Porteous, 'Economic Espionage', Commeniary, No. 32, 1993. http:/Avww.csis- 
scrs.gc.ca/cng/conuncnt/com46e.htiTTl
”  Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., pp. 5-7.
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1.2. COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE
The first phase of the intelligence cycle is collection.'*At this phase targeted data are 
collected by using several methods. These methods include human intelligence collection 
(Humint), technical intelligence collection which has various subfields, and open source
collection 19
1.2.1. Human Intelligence (Humint) Collection
Human intelligence collection, or espionage, is what the term "intelligence" is most likely 
to bring to mind. Although espionage is only one aspect of intelligence operations, it is an 
important source of information for any government attempting to learn the secrets of 
other nations. Its essence is in identifying and recruiting into one’s service someone who 
has access to important information and who is willing, for some reason, to pass it to 
officers of an intelligence service.^” Typically, such people have access to this 
information by holding positions of trust in governments. In some cases (especially in 
wartime), the person providing the information may not be a government official but a 
private individual who has the opportunity to observe something of interest, such as a 
ship's arrival in and departure from a harbor.
Usually individuals in two different roles are involved; an intelligence officer, 
who is an employee of the foreign intelligence service, and the source, who provides the 
officer with information for transmission back to the intelligence service's headquarters. 
The intelligence officer, or "handler" maintains communications with the source, passes
Amocs Kovacs, op. cit., p. 145.
”  Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., p. 11.
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on the instructions from the intelligence service's headquarters, provides necessary 
resources (such as copying or communications equipment), and in general, seeks to 
ensure the continuing flow of information.
Espionage is chosen over other means of intelligence collection when physical 
acquisition of a document or object is required, or when only an on-the-spot observer can 
procure the information desired. Espionage methods are generally the same whether 
conducted for reasons of national security, economic gain, or political leverage. Agents 
can install wiretaps or "bugs" (concealed microphones), steal, buy, or transcribe 
documents, steal equipment, or simply observe with their own eyes. Agents convey the 
information thus acquired to a parent intelligence service by radio, by leaving the 
information at a "drop," or by hand-delivery either in person or through a courier.
There are several types of espionage agents. The professional spy popularized in 
fiction is often an "illegal" who passes him- or herself off as a fictitious person complete 
with forged identity papers. The "illegal" may work alone or establish a spy ring. Another 
type of agent is the part-time spy who maintains an open, legal existence (often as a 
diplomat or businessperson) and conducts espionage on the side. A "plant" is an agent 
who is positioned within the target organization for an extended period of time. The 
"insider" or "recruit" is a member of the target organization who has shifted loyalties and 
who produces information on a regular basis. Historically, the "insider" is probably the 
most productive type of agent. "Insiders" can be recruited by ideological appeals, by 
offers of money, or by blackmail.^'
Ibid., pp. 63-66.
Michael Herman, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
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1.2.1. Technical Intelligence Collection
All forms and techniques of intelligence are now aided by an accelerating technology of 
communications and a variety of computing and measuring devices. Miniaturized 
cameras and microfilm have made easier for persons engaged in all forms of espionage to 
photograph secret documents and conceal the films. Satellites also have an espionage 
function - that of aerial photography for such purposes as detecting secret military 
installations. The vanguard of these developments is highly secret, but it is known that 
telephones can be tapped without wires, rooms can be bugged (planted with electronic 
listening and recording devices) without entry, and photographs can be made in the 
dark.^^
1.2.2.1. Signals Intelligence (Sigint)
Signals intelligence (Sigint) is traditionally considered to be one of the most important 
and sensitive forms of intelligence. The interception of foreign signals can provide data 
on a nation's diplomatic, scientific, and economic plans or events as well as the 
characteristics of radar, spacecraft and weapons systems. Sigint can be broken down into 
three components; Communications intelligence (COMINT), Electronics intelligence 
(ELINT) and Radar intelligence (RADINT).^^
As its name indicates, COMINT is intelligence obtained by the interception, 
processing, and analysis of the communications of foreign governments or groups, 
excluding radio and television broadcasts. Communications may take a variety of forms—
Şafak Akça, 'Elektronik İstihbarat Teknolojisi', Strateji no: 96/1, pp. 119-124. 
Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cil., pp. 22-35.
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voice, Morse code, radio-teletype or facsimile. Communications may be encrypted, or 
transmitted in the clear. The targets of COMINT operations are varied. The most 
traditional COMfNT target is diplomatic communications— communications from each 
nation's capital to its diplomatic establishments around the world.
Electronic intercept operations are intended to produce electronic intelligence 
(ELINT) by intercepting the non-communication signals of militai7 and civilian 
hardware, excluding those signals resulting from atomic detonations. The earliest of 
ELINT targets were World War II air defense radar systems. The objective was to gather 
emanations that would allow the identification of the presence and operating 
characteristics of the radar—information that could be used to circumvent or neutralize the 
radar (through direct attack or electronic countermeasures) during bombing raids. 
Information desired included frequencies, signal strengths, pulse lengths and rates, and 
other specifications. Since that time, intelligence, space tracking, and ballistic missile 
early-warning radar have joined the list of ELINT targets.
Radar intelligence—the intelligence obtained from the use of non-imaging radar— 
is similar to ELINT in that no intercepted communications are involved. However, 
RADTNT does not depend on the interception of another object's electronic emanations. It 
is the radar which emanates electronic signals—radio waves—and the deflection of those 
signals allows for intelligence to be derived. Information that can be obtained from 
RADINT includes flight paths, velocity, maneuvering, trajectory, and angle of descent.
The most secure form of transmission is that sent by cables, either landlines or 
underwater cables. Communications or other signals transmitted through such cables 
cannot be snatched out of the air. Interception of cable traffic has involved physically
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tapping into the cables or using "induction" devices that are placed in the proximity of the 
cables and maintenance of equipment at the point of access. This might be unobtainable 
with respect to hardened and protected internal landlines, the type of landline that carries 
much high-priority, secret command and control communications. Undersea cables are 
most vulnerable since the messages transmitted by them are then transmitted by 
microwave relay once the cable reaches land.
A tremendous volume of communications is sent via satellite systems. Domestic 
and international telephone messages, and military and business communications are 
among those regularly transmitted via satellite using ultra, very, super, and extremely 
high frequencies. By locating satellite dishes at the proper locations, an enormous volume 
of traffic can be intercepted. Ground stations that send messages to satellites have 
antennas that direct the signals to the satellite with great accuracy; satellite antennas, on 
the other hand, are smaller and the signals they send back to earth are less narrowly 
focused—perhaps covering several thousand square miles.
1.2.1.1. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Imagery, or IMINT, is the use of space-based, aerial, and ground-based systems to take 
electro-optical, radar, or infrared images. The raw data for Imagery Intelligence is the 
aerial photos taken by Unmanned or Manned Aerial Vehicles, and satellites. Both the 
United States and the former USSR have orbited considerable numbers of reconnaissance 
satellites for photo surveillance, electionic intelligence, nuclear-explosion detection, and
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strategic-missile launch detection. Other nations have also launched a few such 
satellites. '^*
The advent of the reconnaissance satellite has revolutionized clandestine 
collection. In 1961 the United States first orbited its Satellite and Missile Observation 
System, a photographic-reconnaissance satellite apparently designed for the express 
purpose of locating and monitoring Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites. 
Since then, the United States and other nations have launched photo reconnaissance 
satellites on a regular basis. By using satellite sensors for microwave. X-ray, and infrared 
wavelengths, valuable data can be obtained about land and sea resources. Such sensors 
can distinguish between land and water, cities and fields, and corn and wheat as well as 
between distressed corn and vigorous corn.^^
1.2.2. Open Source Collection;
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence derived from public information or 
intelligence which is based on information which can be obtained legally from public 
sources. Intelligence services have always made extensive use of open sources from 
studying foreign press to debriefing businessmen and tourists and collaborating with 
academics and scholars.
The official definition of OSIUT by the U.S. Intelligence Community provides a 
better and more detailed definition.
Ibid., pp. 22-28. 
Ibid.,
“  Ibid., pp. 40-43.
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By Open Source we refer to publicly available information appearing in 
print or electronic form. Open Source information may be transmitted 
through radio, television, and newspapers, or it may be distributed by 
commercial databases, electronic mail networks, or portable electronic 
media such as CD-ROM's. It may be disseminated to a broad public, as 
are the mass media, or to a more select audience, such as gray literature, 
which includes conference proceedings, company shareholder reports, 
and local telephone directories...^^
The information revolution and the proliferation of media and research outlets 
mean that much of a state's intelligence requirements can today be satisfied by a 
comprehensive monitoring of open sources. As the volume and availability of 
information from "open sources" has multiplied as a result of the evolution in information 
technology, ascertaining what relevant information may be on public record has become 
more difficult. While the use of secret information distinguishes finished intelligence 
from other analysis, no analyst can ease his or her conclusions solely on secret 
information without considering what is on public record (open source). Indeed, analysts 
must have command of all relevant information about their subjects, not simply command 
of secret information.
1.3. ANALYSING AND DISSEMINATING INTELLIGENCE
Analysis refers to “the process of transforming the bits and pieces of information that are 
collected in whatever fashion into something that is usable by policymakers and military 
commanders. The result, or 'intelligence product' can take the form of short
Robert D. Steele, Open Source Inlelligence Professional Handbook l.O, 
http:www.oss.net/procecdings/96 Voll/Appendix_A.html, 1996.
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memorandums, elaborate formal reports, briefings or any other means of presenting 
information.” ’^'
The collection of raw intelligence is not an end in itself Once intelligence has 
been collected, it is typically processed, analyzed, and reported by analysts at the 
collecting agency who determine its relevance to existing validated requirements. This 
"raw" or "current" intelligence is then reported electronically or in printed form to the 
customers and to the all-source analytic organizations in the intelligence community. The 
all-source intelligence organizations meld these reports with other information available 
from other intelligence and open sources and provide analytic statements, assessments, 
and reports on the significance of the information. Such all-source analyses may be 
performed on topics of long-term interest and broad scope, which are called "estimates," 
or they may pertain to ongoing or transient events of immediate interest to policymakers.
Computerized data storage systems aid greatly in bringing together the related 
pieces of information that make up a complete intelligence picture. Human intuition and 
creativity play important roles in developing the "informed guesses" that fill gaps in the 
picture. This process of digesting raw intelligence, known as evaluation, yields a product 
that is usable by policymakers. It is up to the policymaker to utilize the intelligence that 
he or she receives in a timely and responsible manner.
Intelligence assessment must be policy relevant. Intelligence does not exist for its 
own sake; it must be relevant to the concerns and problems on which decision and policy 
must be made. Policymakers need support from intelligence to help deal with uncertainty. 
Analysts and their analysis are deemed most useful when they; clarify what is known by
28 Abraham N. Shulsky, op. cit., p. 45.
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laying out the evidence and pointing to cause and-effect patterns; carefully structure 
assumptions and argumentation about what is known and unknowable; bring the expertise
29to bear for planning and action on important long-shot threats and opportunities.
1.4. COVERT ACTION
Covert action is quite different from intelligence collection and analysis. It is a part of 
intelligence activities, which is used as an instrument of foreign policy. Such actions seek 
to influence the political, economic or military situation in a foreign country without 
revealing the country that planted the covert action. Covert actions usually take place in 
one of the forms given below;
1. Provision of political advice and counsel to leaders and influential individuals in 
foreign states.
2. Development of contacts and relationships with individuals who, though not in 
leadership or influential positions at the time, might advance to such positions.
3. Provision of financial support or other assistance to foreign political parties.
4. Provision of assistance to private organizations such as labor unions, youth groups, 
and professional associations.
5. Promulgation of covert propaganda undertaken with the assistance of foreign media 
organizations and individual journalists.
Jack Davis ‘l l ic  Challenge of Managing Uncertainty; Paul Wolfowilz on Intelligence Policy-Relations’ 
Studies in Infel/igena; vo l 39 no. 5, 1996. http://wwvv.odci.gov/csi/sUidies/96unclas/davis.htm
Turgut Değerli, Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti ve Stratejisi, (İstanbul; Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1996), p. 80, 
Mehmet Alay, 'Örtülü Faaliyetler Konsepti', Strateji no. 95/4
Abraham N. Shulsk)', op. cit., pp. 83-109.
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6. Establishment of relationships with friendly intelligence services to provide technical 
training and other assistance.
7. Provision of economic operations by which financial assistance can be provided to 
foreign states for various purposes but conducted through intermediate sources not 
overtly connected with the planting state.
8. Provision of paramilitary or counterinsurgency training to regimes facing civil strife 
where acknowledgment of official involvement is not desired.
9. Development of political action and paramilitary operations that attempt to topple 
foreign regimes and install successors more favorable to the state planting covert 
action.
In the past and still today, covert action has always been the way of silent warfare 
between adversary countries. Cold War years were full of covert operations. Even today 
it is possible to see activities of nations which fall into one of the covert actions forms 
given above. Syria, for instance, has been supporting and training, PKK militants in their 
guerrilla war against Turkey. Thus Syria does not pay a high cost while undermining 
Turkey's economic and political situation which is a very important foreign policy 
objective for Syria. Not only Syria but also a number of other states such as Greece and 
Iraq have allegedly been using PKK in their covert actions. Operations of Turkish 
security forces have revealed ties between PKK and supporting states.
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CHAPTER 2- FOREIGN POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE
Foreign policy is a goal or series of goals that a country hopes to achieve with respect to 
other countries and international issues. States are not the only actors in international 
politics, and increasingly a country's foreign policy extends beyond relations with other 
countries to include interactions with other international actors including international 
organizations, multinational corporations, alliances, regional organizations, and others. 
Foreign policy also includes the tools or instalments that a country employs to achieve its 
international goals. In sum, foreign policy includes how a country decides, what it 
decides, and how it acts.
Intelligence is in fact essential to the maintenance and expansion of political (and 
military) power.^^ In practice, intelligence rarely affects the determination of policy - 
although it does happen. Frequently, however, it does affect the execution of policy. 
Tactical intelligence support adds to certainty and confidence in foreign policy execution; 
it gives immediacy, practicality, and focus to existing general conclusions.
Intelligence does not exist purely for its own sake. Intelligence activities 
(collection, analyzing, disseminating, counterintelligence) and machinery (organizations) 
exist to help the decision-maker decide better in the area intelligence is needed. In other 
words, taking the necessary action is the last step of the intelligence cycle although it is 
not named in the intelligence activities list.
Frederic S. Pearson, Inlenialional Relations: The Global Condition In Late Twentieth Century, (New 
York; McGraw-Hill), 1992, p. 111.
Michael I. Handel, IVar, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass, 1989), p. 219 
Ibid., pp. 188-220.
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National Security and Foreign Policy: National security policy overlaps with foreign 
policy, sometimes even they are almost indistinguishable. However, national security 
differs from foreign policy in at least two respects^^; (1) National security purposes are 
more narrow and focused on security and safety of the nation. (2) National security is 
primarily concerned with actual and potential adversaries and their use of force. This 
means there is a military emphasis that is not usually the case in matters of foreign policy. 
In short, foreign policy is one leg of national security the other one is national defense. 
Thus, national security usually encompasses all the matters of foreign policy.
Intelligence both serves national defense and foreign policy. This makes 
intelligence vital for national security, especially during peacetime when the principal 
arm of national defense, the military, is not in use.
2.1. THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY:
In order to adopt and implement foreign policy, to plan military strategy and to organize 
armed forces, to conduct diplomacy, to negotiate arms control agreements, or to 
participate in international organization activities, nations have vast information 
requirements. As a result of these requirements many governments maintain some kind of 
intelligence capability as a matter of survival in a world where dangers and uncertainties 
still exist. The cold war may have ended, but hostilities continue in parts of Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
Sam C. Sarkcsian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Proceceses, and Politics (Colorado; Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 5.
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One fundamental reason for the existence of the intelligence community is the 
purpose of reducing uncertainty on political and military issues. The more nations can 
reduce uncertainty about the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries, the more 
likely they can avoid conflicts resulting from fear of surprise attack or from other 
mistakes. Foreign/Strategic intelligence, in short, can have a stabilizing effect on world 
affairs. Conducting and avoiding diplomatic surprise also require intelligence and counter 
intelligence activities.
2.1.1. Foreign Policy Process and Intelligence:
The foreign policy process is how a countiy decides on policy and its implementation. 
Policy choices are influenced by who makes decisions and how decisions are made. 
Within a particular type of government, such as a democracy, there is no single foreign 
policy process, but rather a variety of processes. There are several explanations about 
how and why the policy process varies. The most common is the idea that different types 
of issues are processed differently. One distinction is between crisis and non-crisis policy. 
Crisis policy is normally decided by the political leader (such as the president or prime 
minister) and a small circle of the leader's close advisors with little general debate or 
public dissent. Non-crisis policy is subject to wider discussion and dissent and may even 
be decided by lower levels of the government.^^In both cases intelligence plays a vital 
role in policy process. Crisis or non-crisis, a policy can not be effective without proper 
intelligence provided in a timely manner.
Michael 1. Handel, op. cit., p.
Frederic S. Pearson, op. cil., pp. 203 -206.
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2.1.1. Models of Foreign Policy Making and Intelligence:
There are a number of models of the foreign policy process. One of the most common is 
the "rational-actor model." This model suggests that policymakers examine their options, 
define their goals, examine the various alternative ways of achieving their options, and 
select the most effective method to implement the chosen policy.^* This model requires 
reliable intelligence. Without the intelligence rational actor model does not work 
properly.
Another view is the "bureaucratic model." Here, various parts of the executive 
branch have differing views of what policy should be. These views are based, in part, on 
the divergent, self-interested goals of bureaucratic units. Policy, according to this model, 
is the result of the stmggle among the bureaucratic actors.^’ Since the national security 
institutions such as military and intelligence agencies are parts of the bureaucratic 
mechanism, intelligence has a word to say in the bureaucratic model too.
2.2. Foreign Policy Goals and Intelligence:
The international goals that a country is trying to achieve range from the very specific 
(resolve a border dispute) to the general (enhance the country's influence). In an 
international system of sovereign, often competing, countries, foreign policy goals are 
usually self-interested objectives. Less frequently, goals may be cooperative among 
several countries (alliance behavior) or, still less often, motivated by idealism 
(humanitarian foreign aid). When countries pursue self-interested goals, they are said to
John Spanier, Games Nations Plays, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), p.647. 
Frederic S. Peterson, op. cit., pp. 220-22.
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be following their "national interest." In pursing national interest policies countries have 
vast intelligence requirements. The following lines explain the elements of national 
interest.
The core element of national interest is national defense providing for the physical 
safety of a country's citizens. A second element is providing for the economic prosperity 
of the counti'y insofar as it is affected by the supply of resources, trade balances, 
monetary exchange rates, and other factors of the international political economy. A third 
element of national interest is providing a favorable political environment. At a minimum 
this includes the ability of a country's citizens to choose their own form of government, 
and it may also include promoting values (individual rights) and processes (democracy) 
in other countries that are compatible with one's own values and processes. A fourth 
national interest element is ensuring national cohesion. This means avoiding foreign 
policies or other pressures (separatist movements that threaten civil war), irreconcilable 
domestic divisions, or other clashes that could fragment the country .N one of these 
elements of national interest can be satisfied without proper intelligence and counter 
intelligence activities.
2.3, Foreign Policy linpicmentation and Intelligence:
Countries have a variety of instruments by which they can attempt to achieve their 
foreign policy goals. These tools include military instrument, penetration and intervention 
instrument, diplomatic instalment and covert operations. The degree to which a countiy 
can use any of these instruments will vary according to the country's power, which is
•10 K.J. Holsli, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, (London: Prcnticc/Hall, 1974), pp. 136- 
139.
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defined as its ability to force or persuade another country to act in a desirable way. A 
country may be powerful in some ways and not in others. Japan has vast economic power 
and much less military power. The former Soviet Union had enormous military power 
and little economic power. The applicability of power will also vary with the situation. 
The military instrument relies on the implicit or explicit threat to use force and the actual 
use of force. The possession of military power is also a tool because it enhances a 
country's reputation and increases its influence. Despite its staggering economy and 
political disarray, the Soviet Union remained a superpower because of its military 
capability.'*'
Cross-border invasion is now less acceptable behavior, although some still justify 
the application of limited force, especially within implicitly recognized spheres of 
influence by a major power (the U.S. incursions into Grenada and Panama, for example). 
Penetration and intervention involves trying to manipulate another country's domestic 
political situation and process. This instalment can be accomplished through such 
methods as propaganda, military support of dissidents, co-opting political leaders, 
sabotage, and terrorism.
The diplomatic instrument involves communicating with another country. 
Methods include direct, government-to-government negotiations and presenting its case 
in the arena of an international organization. The United Nations, for example, is the 
forum for debates and diplomatic maneuvering on a wide variety of issues, and it has 
rendered decisions (often rejected or ignored) on many international disputes.
John Spanier, op. cit., pp. 371-462.
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Covert action, as explained in Chapter 1, is a part of intelligence activities. 
Foreign intelligence activities, particularly the covert actions are widely conducted by 
countries to implement foreign policy. As noted by one of the experts in the field "every 
nation with a capacity for covert action finds it a virtually irresistible alternative at times 
to more overt instruments of foreign policy, such as overt war and diplomacy. Open 
warfare is always too noisy and formal; diplomacy is often too slow and frustrating."^
2.2. DECISION-MAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE:
Decision-makers usually have little knowledge of the whole intelligence cycle, especially 
about those which occur behind the scenes; collection, exploitation, processing, and 
evaluation of raw data.''^ Therefore from the perspective of the intelligence professional, 
policy makers usually do not pay necessary attention that intelligence deserves. In fact 
several reasons are involved in shaping the relationships between decision-makers and 
intelligence.
2.2.1. Personality and Leadership Style; The type of relationship between intelligence 
and decision-maker is heavily affected by the management style that surrounds the 
intelligence community and the whole government machinery. In a democratic society, 
for instance, the attention that intelligence attracts would be much more different from
Loch K. Johnson, ‘Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective’, in A. Stuart Parson (ed.) Security 
and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s (London: Fnuik Cass 1991), p. 
60.
Kevin Stack, 'Competitive Intelligence', Intelligence and National Security vol. 13 no. 4 (Winter 1998), 
p. 194.
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the one in a totalitarian system.'*'* No leader is expected to accept intelligence estimates 
without first considering their relevance to his/her preferred policy or strategy. Hitler or 
Stalin could not tolerate information that contradicted their own beliefs or policies.'*^On 
the other hand “intelligence- based action is the antithesis of leadership by ideology.”'*** 
"It is particularly noteworthy that many policy disasters have occurred when intelligence 
was not consulted. When statesmen rely solely on their own beliefs about environment 
they may steer the ship of state straight toward a reef, as Kennedy did in the Bay of Pigs 
and Khruschev did 18 months later when he placed missiles in Cuba."'*^
2.2.2. Setting Priorities: Decision-makers need to set clear foreign policy objectives and 
priorities. If the priorities of policymakers are unclear, the intelligence community will be 
uncertain about what it is expected to deliver and will exert its energies toward efforts 
that may be ignored. In democracies, the intelligence community does not exist for its 
own sake. Rather it exists to serve to the needs of decision-makers in their decision­
making process. Collected intelligence once delivered to the decision-maker, might be a 
part of foreign policy or military issues.
2.2.3. Understanding the world of intelligence: Naive politicians often do not have 
enough information on the intelligence community’s activities and products.
See for detailed information Michael I. Handel, JVar, Strategy and Intelligence (London; Frank Cass, 
1989), pp. 283-300.
Ibid.,
46 Michael Herman, op. cit., p. 138
Robert Jervis, 'Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy’, in A. Sliiart Parson (cd.) Security and 
Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspective.',· For The 1990s (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 169.
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Misperceiving the intelligence world leads the policymakers to stay away from 
everything that intelligence business involves. Thus they become inefficient in using 
intelligence in policymaking.
2.2.4. Politicizing intelligence; Intelligence assessments must be policy neutral.'*  ^ The 
hallmark of intelligence is that it is based on fact, knowledge and rigorous analysis to 
explain as objectively as possible what is happening and what is likely to happen in an 
area or situation which requires that decisions be taken or policy made. The product of 
intelligence analysis must present the situations as one sees them, without regard to 
whether judgments will support or challenge decision-makers' perceptions and the 
existing policy.'*  ^ Intelligence is useful only to the extent that provides objective value. 
Not only the attitude of decision-makers cause politicization of intelligence, competition 
among different intelligence services within the government may also politicize 
intelligence activities, products, and use.
2.2.5. Lack of coordination: Policymakers sometimes fail to communicate effectively 
their needs to the intelligence community and generally make poor use of the 
intelligence. Although it is not directly related to the personality of the policy maker, a 
strong and effective coordination between the intelligence community and office of the 
policy-maker is essential for better decision making. The decision-maker, therefore, 
should pay attention to better coordination.
<18Blair Seaborn, ‘Inlclligcnce and Policy; Whal Is Conslanl? Whal Is Changing?’ Commentary, No:45, 
June 1994.
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2.2.7. Underestimating the intelligence product: Some policymakers tend to heavily 
rely on their own analysis and judgment whilst the finished intelligence product is 
waiting for attention in a given situation. One of the reasons why policymakers pay little 
attention is that they think their own general knowledge of the situation provides an 
adequate basis for their decisions.^’’
2.2.8. Measures of Effectiveness for Intelligence: Can a policy-maker measure 
effectiveness of intelligence? This question is particularly important since the intelligence 
community needs clear policy guidance and feedback from the policy-makers. An expert 
on the subject answers this question as follows; Intelligence is deemed effective when;
1.Causing a commander or decision-maker to change a previously 
chosen policy or course of action. 2. Enabling a different (hopefully 
better) execution of a chosen policy or course of action. 3. Playing a 
pivotal role in the decision-making process (in the sense that had this 
intelligence not been available, a different decision would have been 
reached.) 4. Forcing the adversary to change or modify the execution 
of his policy or course of action; 5. Enhancing the effects of our own 
chosen policy or diminishing adverse effects of the enemy's actions.^'
Summai'y:
Chapter 2 basically aims to explain why good intelligence is necessary to formulate a 
better foreign policy from a theoretical perspective. It summarizes briefly the importance 
of intelligence in foreign policy process, in models of foreign policy making, in foreign 
policy goals, and in foreign policy implementation. The relationship between the policy-
Hasan Koni, ‘İstihbarat Pazarlama ve Dış Politika’,/lw w v a  Dosyası vol. 2 no. 1 (summer 1995)
Robert Jervis, op. cit., p. 172.
Amos Kovacs, ‘Using Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security vol. 12 no. 4 (October 1997)
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maker and intelligence is also discussed. The factors influencing decision-makers’ 
attitudes toward intelligence, such as personal background, leadership style, politicizing 
intelligence, and setting priorities are explained.
Having explained, described and discussed main concepts in Chapters 1 and 2 
(intelligence and foreign policy), now an introduction to successful systems (the UK and 
the US systems), can be made. The following chapters will investigate the British and 
American intelligence systems.
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CHAPTER 3 - THE BRITISH SYSTEM
3.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN UK
British Governments have long refused to acknowledge that they have foreign espionage 
services/^ Only the 1994 Intelligence Services Act placing the functions of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on a 
statutory basis echoed the existence of these services officially for the first time.^^
Figure 3.1. Tlic UK Intelligence Community
Christopher Andrew, ‘The British View of Security and Intelligence’, in A. Stuart Parson (ed.) Security 
and Jnlelligence In A Changing World: Ncm’ Perspectives For The 79P0.v (London; Frank Cass, 1991), p. 10
K. G. Robertson, ‘Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom Democratization or Risk 
Management?’, Intelligence and National Security vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998)
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As depicted in figure 3.1. the United Kingdom has three intelligence and security services, 
collectively known as the Agencies - the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ. The operations 
and functions of all three have been placed on a statutoiy basis, by the provisions of the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994, and the Security Service Acts 1989 and 1996. Another 
important contributor to the central intelligence machinery is the Defense Intelligence Staff 
(DIS), which is an integral part of the Ministry of Defense.
3.1.1. Security Service
The Security Service, also known as MI5, originated in 1909 as the internal arm of the 
Secret Service Bureau, tasked with countering German espionage. In 1931 it assumed 
wider responsibility for assessing threats to British national security which included 
international communist subversion and fascism. The Security Service Act places the 
service under the authority of the Home Secretary. The Act also sets out the functions of 
the Service, as well as certain controls and oversight arrangements. '^* As the UK's domestic 
security intelligence agency the service's purpose is to protect the state against substantial, 
overtly organized threats, primarily from terrorism, espionage and subversion. Most 
recently, since the passing of the Security Seiwice Act 1996, its role has been expanded to 
provide support to law enforcement agencies in the field of organized crime. Within the 
UK intelligence machinery, the Service's role is to investigate threats by gathering, 
analyzing and assessing intelligence; to counter specific threats by taking action, where 
appropriate in conjunction with others; and to advise the government and others as
HMSO, MI5: The Security Sen’ice, (London: The Stationery OfTice, 1998), p. 5.
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necessary on the nature of the threat, and on relevant protective security measures. 55
3.1.2. Secret Intelligence Sei*vice (SIS)
The Secret Intelligence Service, also known as M16, originated in 1909 as the Foreign 
Section of the Secret Service Bureau. With the passing of the Intelligence Services Act, SIS 
was placed on a statutory basis under the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary to whom it 
is responsible for all aspects of its work. The act defines the role of MI6 as; “a) to obtain 
and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British 
Islands; and (b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons, 
[in relation to] the interests of national security, with particular reference to defense and 
foreign policies...the interests of the economic well-being of the UK or in support of the 
prevention or detection of serious crime.”
The Service's principal role is the production of secret intelligence in support of 
government's security, defense, foreign and economic policies within the framework of 
requirements laid upon it by the Joint Intelligence Committee and approved by Ministers. It 
meets these JIC requirements for intelligence gathering and other tasks through a variety of 
sources, human and technical and by liaison with a wide range of foreign intelligence and 
security services. Specific operations are subject to long-standing procedures for official 
and ministerial clearance.
.55
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3.1.3. Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
GCIIQ provides government departments and military commands with signal intelligence 
(Sigint) in support of government's security, defense, foreign and economic policies. The 
Director of GCHQ is responsible to the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary. GCHQ 
derives signal intelligence by monitoring a variety of communications and other signals, 
such as radars. For this purpose it controls and administers the Composite Signals 
Organization which operates from a number of locations in the UK and overseas. Like SIS 
and the Security Service, it also works in liaison with a range of foreign intelligence and 
security services.^* In addition to providing signals intelligence, GCHQ also provides 
advice and assistance to government departments and the armed forces on the security of 
their communications and information technology systems.
3.1.4. Defense Intelligence StalT (DIS)
The Defense Intelligence Staff, part of the Ministry of Defense, is an essential element of 
the central intelligence machinery. The Chief of Defense Intelligence (CDI) is responsible 
for the work of the DIS and is charged also with the overall direction of intelligence within 
the defense community. The task of the DIS is to analyze information from a wide variety 
of sources, both overt and covert. In order to make decisions. Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
policy-makers, military planners and force commanders need an accurate view of world 
developments, timely warning of impending crises, and informed reporting on areas where 
British forces are or may be deployed. These are the tasks of the Defense Intelligence Staff
Ibid.,
59 Government Communications Headquarters ofTicial web site. hltp://www.gchq.gov.uk
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(DIS), which produces assessments drawing on material from a variety of sources, 
including both open literature and classified reports. These assessments range from studies 
of the characteristics of weapon systems held by potential opponents, to the analysis of the 
influences at work in any part of the world where the United Kingdom has important 
interests.
3.2.0VERS1GHT AND ACCOUNTABILTY OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY:
Under the Security Service Act and the Intelligence Services Act, legislative and executive 
branches oversee UK intelligence agencies.
3.2.1. Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (IS)
In their day-to-day operations the Intelligence and Security Agencies operate under the 
immediate control of their respective heads that are personally responsible to Ministers. 
The Prime Minister is responsible for intelligence and security matters overall and is 
supported in that capacity by the Secretary of the Cabinet. The Home Secretary is 
responsible for the Security Service; the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary for SIS and 
GCIIQ. The Secretary of State for Defense is responsible for the Defense Intelligence Staff 
(DIS) which forms an integral part of the Ministry of Defense.^“
There is also a Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services (IS), whose 
Terms of Reference are "To keep under review policy on the security and intelligence 
services" for example, the Committee considered policy issues connected with the
The UK Central Intelligence Machinery'' official web site 
hUp.7/\vww. cabinet-office, gov.uk/cabscc/1998/cini/cirnrep 1 .him
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Intelligence Services Act. The Prime Minister is its chairman and the other members are 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Home, Defense and Foreign & Commonwealth Secretaries and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
3.2.2. Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS):
Ministers are assisted in the oversight of the Agencies by the Permanent Secretaries' 
Committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS) which scrutinizes the Agencies' annual 
expenditure forecasts, management plans and intelligence requirements, as part of the 
Public Expenditure Survey arrangements. These plans, together with the recommendations 
of the PSIS, are then submitted to Ministers, who agree the appropriate level of funding for 
the Agencies through the Single Intelligence Vote (SIV). For 1996-97 this is £751 million. 
PSIS is chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and its members are the Permanent Under 
Secretaries of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, Home Office and 
Treasury. The Intelligence Coordinator acts as adviser to PSIS, and chairs an advisory 
committee, known as the Preliminary Committee, which conducts the first scrutiny of the 
Agencies' Expenditure Forecasts.
3.2.3. The Intelligence and Security Committee:
Parliamentary oversight of the Agencies is provided by the Intelligence and Security 
Committee, established by the Intelligence Services Act and operating within the 'ring of 
secrecy', which examines their expenditure, administration and policy. Its cross-party
Ibid.,
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membership of nine from both Houses is appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation 
with the Leader of the Opposition. The Committee is required to report annually to the 
Prime Minister on its work. These reports, after deletions of operationally sensitive 
material, are placed before the Parliament by the Prime Minister. The Committee may 
also, and does, provide ad hoc reports to the Prime Minister from time to time.
3.2.4. Commissioners
Under the Security Service Act and the Intelligence Services Act, the Agencies are subject 
to oversight by two commissioners (the Security Service Commissioner and the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner) who must hold, or have held, high Judicial office. 
They review the issue and authorization, by the relevant Secretary of State, of warrants for 
interference with property and also assist the Tribunals established by the Acts to 
investigate public complaints against the Agencies. They report annually to the Prime 
Minister on their work and their reports are in turn laid before the Parliament. A third 
commissioner operates in a similar manner under the Interception of Communications Act 
of 1985 in respect to the authorization of warrants to intercept mail and 
telecommunications on application from the intelligence and security Agencies and law 
enforcement organizations. The Commissioner also assists a Tribunal established to 
investigate public complaints about interception.
K. G. Robertson, ‘Recent Reform of Intelligence in the United Kingdom DcmocratiziUion or Risk 
Management?’, Intelligence and National Security vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 149-150.
43
3.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING
3.3.1. The Central Intelligence Machinery
The Central Intelligence Machinery is the central mechanism, based in the Cabinet Office, 
for the tasking, coordination and resourcing of the United Kingdom's intelligence and 
security Agencies, for scrutinizing their performance and for reporting on the intelligence 
they produce.
3.3.2. The Joint Intelligence Committee
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is the main instrument for advising on priorities for 
intelligence gathering and for assessing its results. The JIC is responsible both for setting 
the UK's national intelligence requirements and for producing regular intelligence 
assessments on a range of situations and issues of current concern for ministers and 
officials. It meets weekly, and its members are senior officials in the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defense, Department of Trade & Industry, and the 
Treasury, the Heads of the three intelligence and security Agencies, the Intelligence 
Coordinator and the Chief of the Assessments Staff. Other Departments attend as 
appropriate. The JTC is supported by a permanent Assessments Staff and Secretariat as well 
as a number of specialist interdepartmental Sub-Committees.^'*
The JIC's support staff is the Assessments Staff, which comprises a mixture of 
senior and middle ranking officers seconded from various departments, services and
The UK Central Intelligence Machinery' official web site can be found at 
http:/A\'ww.cabinct-officc.gov.uk/cabsec/1998/cini/cimrcpl.lUin
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disciplines, and is responsible for drafting assessments of situations and issues of current 
concern. These assessments are subjected to inter-departmental scrutiny at the drafting 
stage in sub-committees of the JIC, known as Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs), which 
bring together experts from a range of Government Departments and Agencies. The text is 
then normally submitted to the JIC for approval before being circulated to Ministers and 
senior officials, though in cases of urgency it can be issued immediately. The Assessments 
Staff and the CIGs draw on all relevant information, overt and covert.
The Joint Intelligence Secretariat is responsible for the administration of the JIC and 
its sub-committees, and for support to the Intelligence Coordinator. Together with the 
Assessments Staff, it is located in the Cabinet Office; its personnel are either seconded 
from other Departments or permanent Cabinet Office staff
3.3.3. Iiitelligeiiice Coordinator:
The Intelligence Coordinator advises the Secretary of the Cabinet on the coordination of 
the intelligence machinery and its resources and programs. He chairs various formal and 
informal groups charged with intelligence management. He has particular responsibility for 
establishing the United Kingdom's intelligence requirements and for advising on the 
allocation of the resources to enable the agencies to meet them.
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3.4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM:
The importance of the intelligence to UK may be best explained by the following 
expressions; “...apart from intelligence’s influence on particular decisions, there is the 
cumulative influence on national standing of having well-informed policies. This has 
been particularly relevant to Britain as a nation of declining economic power wishing 
nevertheless to maintain world status...Intelligence has been one element in this position. 
Good intelligence has helped Britain to play bad hands with some finesse.”*’^
With its military capacity -including nuclear power-, economic capacity, 
geographic location, natural resources, educated population, quality of the political 
system and leadership and relatively high national morale, Britain is ranked among the 
most powerftil states of the world.Engaging in two major world wars (WWI and WW 
II) and one cold war, British intelligence community has had the chance of testing, 
developing, and improving its structure to meet the nation’s needs. The wartime prestige 
of the British success caused its pattern to be copied fairly widely after 1945. The US and 
the Commonwealth countries adopted the British pattern.^^
Cold War years are especially important to the development of the intelligence 
community. Foreign intelligence activities have played a key role during the Cold War. 
Clandestine collection techniques were improved. Covert operations were widely 
exercised. Technical intelligence collection capabilities were increased. Moreover 
combating against internal terrorist threats (IRA) have led the British Intelligence to 
develop a strong security intelligence agency.
6.·;
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Declassified intelligence operations give ideas on how successful the UK system. 
However, real success should be sought in the overall foreign policy performance. As 
explained in Chapter 2, sound foreign policy-making and implementing should be 
accompanied by high quality intelligence analysis and operations. The overall 
performance of British foreign policy in world affairs proves that the UK foreign 
intelligence is successful, especially compared with other states’ intelligence systems.
At the Lausanne Conference in 1922-23, decrypted telegrams, which provided 
most of the Turkish delegation's correspondence contributed to British negotiating 
tactics.*’*' British intelligence played a major role in bringing the US into WWI. Public 
revelations of German intelligence attempts to prevent US industry and the financial 
sector from assisting the UK angered the American public. British intelligence 
intercepted and decrypted German diplomatic traffic, also as the known Zimmerman 
telegram, showing a German effort to push the Mexican government into joining 
Germany against the US in return for Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico if Germany won 
the war.**’
One of the crucial successes of British intelligence is the operation named 
ULTRA. During WW II Germany committed virtually its entire secret communication 
system to the Enigma cipher machine. British code-breakers managed to construct a 
model of the Enigma machine and, as a result uncovered its secrets. The intercepted 
secret German signals decrypted by the Enigma machine, gave unparalleled advantage to 
the Allies. The Allies learned in advance all the plans and moves of the Germans. This
Michael Herman, op. cit., p.24.
Ibid., p. 153
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enormous advantage remained a secret not only for the duration of the war but for almost 
thirty years afterward.™ Starting actively in the mid of 1960 IRA’s terrorist activities 
disturbed the British governments. The response to these activities from British 
governments were decisive and served as a deterrent by the help of high quality
71intelligence operations.
As stated previously, the current British intelligence system has developed 
through the major wars and the political events of this century. In chapter 1, the main 
concepts of intelligence, and in chapter 2 the relationships between intelligence and 
foreign policy making are explained. Main collection disciplines of intelligence are met 
in the British system by separate organizations. The SIS collects foreign intelligence 
including economic intelligence and conducts covert operations. The GCHQ collects and 
analyzes the foreign signal intelligence. Defense Intelligence Staff is tasked the military 
intelligence. The Security Service is responsible for domestic intelligence in combating 
terrorism, and counterespionage. Thus the British Intelligence Community covers all 
aspects of intelligence.
Table 3.2. Shows the organizations tasked for oversight and accountability of the 
intelligence community. These external oversight agencies from executive and legislative 
branches of the British government play an important role not only in watching closely 
the activities of the community but also in giving feedback, and in fostering improvement 
of the agencies.
Ibid., p. 154
70 Charles D. Amcringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 146-155.
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Collection
S e c r e t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  S e n / i c e  ( F o r e i g n  I n t e l l i g e n c e )
G o v e r n m e n t  C o m m u n i c a t i o n  H e a d q u a r t e r s  ( S i g n a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  a n d  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S e c u r i t y )
D e f e n s e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  S t a f f  ( M i l i t a r y  I n t e l l i g e n c e )
S e c u r i t y  S e r v i c e  ( D o m e s t i c  I n t e l l i g e n c e )
O ve rsigh t and 
A cco un ta bility
M i n i s t e r i a l  C o m m i t t e e  O n  T h e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  S e r v i c e s
P e r m a n e n t  S e c r e t a r i e s  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  S e r v i c e s
T h e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  a n d  S e c u r i t y  C o m m i t t e e
C o m m i s s i o n e r s
Coordination
C e n t r a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  M a c h i n e r y
T h e  J o i n t  I n t e l l i g e n c e  C o m m i t t e e
I n t e l l i g e n c e  C o o r d i n a t o r
Tabic 3.2. The U.K. Intelligence Establishments in Relation to Collection, Oversight and
Accountability
The intelligence community in the British system finds its place in the policy­
making process through the establishments, Central Intelligence Machinery, The Joint 
Intelligence Committee, and the Intelligence coordinator. These establishments are in the 
Cabinet, which is the highest level of the policy making process.
Sec for example James Rennie, The Operators: Inside 14 Intelligence Company, (London: BCA, 1996).
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CHAPTER 4 - THE US SYSTEM
The surprise attack by Japan on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, was a great intelligence success for the Japanese and an intelligence failure for the 
Americans. That failure stimulated the postwar growth of a massive intelligence 
apparatus in the U.S.A. Before World War II the U.S. intelligence system was not a 
significant one; after the war the US government authorities gave the start to build up a
massive intelligence apparatus.72
4.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE U.S.A.
In the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense 
HUMINT Service, an element of the Defense Intelligence Agency, are the primary 
collectors of HUMfNT. Signal intelligence is collected by the National Security Agency. 
The Central Imagery Office coordinates imagery collection and processing.
D i r e c t o r  o f  C e n t r a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e
Centra l In te lligence Agency
Com m unity M anagem ent S ta ff
National In te lligence Council
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e  ( D o D )
_Defense In te lligence Agency
National Security Agency
National Reconna issance O ffice
A ir Force In te lligence
Army In te lligence
Marine Corps In te lligence
Navy In te lligence
National Mapping Agency
D e p a r t m e n t a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  E l e m e n t s  ( n o n - D o D )
Departm ent O f S tate
Departm ent of Energy
Departm ent of the T reasury
Federal Bureau of Investigation
 ^Charles D. Anieringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, (Massachusetts; Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 177-183.
Sam C. Sarkcsian, U.S. National Security: Policyinakens, Processes, and Politics (Colorado; Lynne
Rienncr Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 137.
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4.1.1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), established by the National Security Act of 1947, 
is led by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who manages CIA in addition to 
serving as head of the Intelligence Community. CIA collects, evaluates, and disseminates 
foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US Government policymakers in 
making decisions relating to national security.^'' CIA's mission is to provide the 
President, the National Security Council, and all officials who make and execute US 
national security policy with accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on 
national security topics. CIA also conducts counterintelligence activities, special 
activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as 
directed by the President.
CIA collects foreign intelligence information through a variety of clandestine and 
overt means. The Agency also engages in research, development, and deployment of 
high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes and—in support of the DCI's role as 
the President's principal intelligence advisor—performs and reports all-source analysis on 
the full range of topics that affect national security.
4.1.2. National Security Agency (NSA)
The National Security Agency is the largest and the most secret of the intelligence 
agencies of the U.S. government. It has two main functions; to protect U.S. government 
communications and to intercept foreign communications. It protects government
74
75
Charles D. Anieringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, (Massacluisclts: l.cxington Books, 1990), pp. 201-209.
Sain C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Proceses, and Politics (Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), pp. 129-133.
51
communications by enciphering messages and taking other measures to ensure their 
secrecy. In its foreign intelligence function the NSA employs a vast corps of intelligence 
analysts who use sensitive electronic equipment to monitor, decipher, and translate the 
communications of foreign governments. It could follow space rocket launchings in the 
former USSR and can overhear conversations between aircraft pilots and ground-control 
personnel in remote areas of the globe. The NSA was established in 1952 as a separately 
organized agency within the Department of Defense. It replaced the Armed Forces 
Security Agency.^^
4.1.3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a designated combat support agency and the 
senior military intelligence component of the intelligence community. Established in 
1961, DIA's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the US armed forces. 
Intelligence support for operational forces encompasses targeting and battle damage 
assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of impending crises, support to peacekeeping 
operations, maintenance of data bases on foreign military organizations and their 
equipment and, as necessary, support to UN operations and US allies. In addition to 
these, DIA has other important customers, including policymakers in the Department of 
Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DIA plays a key role in 
providing information on foreign weapons systems to US weapons planners and the
weapons acquisition community. 77
' Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, (Massachusetts; Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 192-193 
Ibid., p. 192.
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4.2.0VERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY
The US Intelligence Community is subject to external oversight from the Executive and 
Legislative branches. Within the Executive, the Intelligence Oversight Board, a standing 
committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, exercises overall 
oversight of the Community's activities, including the responsibility to oversee the 
functioning of the agencies' internal oversight mechanisms. In addition, the Office of 
Management and Budget plays a role in ensuring consistency with the President's 
program. Within the Congress, principal oversight responsibility rests with the two 
intelligence committees, but other committees occasionally become involved in an
oversight role. 78
4.2.1. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB); The PFIAB is an 
entity within the Executive Office of the President formed to assess the quality, quantity, 
and adequacy of intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and other activities 
of the intelligence community. The PFIAB reports directly to the President, and provides 
recommendations for actions to improve and enhance the performance of intelligence 
efforts. It also examines issues raised by the President or the Director of Central 
Intelligence and can make recommendations directly to the DCI.’  ^ Membership of the 
PFIAB consists of not more that 16 persons appointed by the President. The PFIAB,
Preparing for tlie 2 r ‘ Century: An Appraisal of US Intelligence, March 1996, 
http;//ww.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/in(/report.html
Charles D. Ameringcr, U.S. Foreign Intelligence, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 352-353.
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through its intelligence Oversight Board, also advises the President on the legality of 
foreign intelligence activities.
4.2.2. President's Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB): The lOB is a standing 
committee of the PFIAB. The lOB is composed of four members of the PFIAB appointed 
by the Chairman of the PFIAB. The lOB conducts independent oversight investigations 
as required and reviews the oversight practices and procedures of the inspectors general 
and general counsels of intelligence agencies.
4.2.3. Office of Management and Budget (OMB): 0MB is part of the Executive Office 
of the President. It reviews intelligence budgets in light of presidential policies and 
priorities, clears proposed testimony, and approves draft intelligence legislation for 
submission to Congress.
4.2.4. The Congress
Principal oversight responsibility rests with the two intelligence committees. By law, the 
President must ensure that these two committees are kept "fully and currently" informed 
of the activities of the Intelligence Community, including any significant anticipated 
intelligence activities. Notice is also required to be provided to both committees of all 
covert action programs approved by the President as well as all significant intelligence 
failures.
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4.2.4.1. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI): Membership of the SSCI has 
ranged from 13 to 17, with the majority party in Congress having one more member than 
the minority. Members of the SSCI serve 8-year terms. In addition to its role in annually 
authorizing appropriations for intelligence activities, the SSCI carries out oversight 
investigations and inquiries as required. It also handles presidential nominations referred 
to the Senate for the positions of DCI, Deputy DCI, and Inspector General of CIA, and 
reviews treaties referred to the Senate for ratification as necessary to determine the ability 
of the intelligence community to verify the provisions of the treaty under consideration.
4.2.4.2. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI): The HPSCI has 
19 members. Members may be appointed for terms up to eight years. Like its Senate 
counterpart, the HPSCI conducts oversight investigations and inquiries in addition to 
recessing the annual authorization of appropriations for intelligence.
4.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING:
There are many actors in making foreign policy in the U.S. system. Some of them are 
formal actors whose roles are defined by either constitution or law. Some of them are 
informal. Public opinion, media, interest groups, parties, think tanks, congress, 
bureaucracy (State, Defense, CIA..), The National Security Council and finally the 
President.”^
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4.3.1. The President: In the U.S. system the President is ultimately held responsible for 
foreign policy and its conduct.**^  The President is commander in Chief, which means that 
he has the power to deploy American forces that is a way usually seen in American 
foreign policy. A second major power of the President is the treaty-making. The 
Constitution gives the president power to sign treaties. A third power of the President is 
appointment of high-level foreign policy officials. These include secretaries of State, 
Defense, the director of the CIA, UN representative, NSC staff, all ambassadors, and 
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. And lastly, the President is also the nation's 
chief spokesperson on foreign policy, and the only official voice.
4.3.2. The National Security Council:
The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national 
security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet 
officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has 
been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The 
council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among 
various government agencies. **^ The National Security Council (NSC) was established by 
the National Security Act of 1947 as part of the Executive Office of the President of the 
United States. Its purpose is to advise the President on national security matters, taking 
into consideration the country's domestic, foreign, and military policies. Statutory
Stephen Knot, 'Executive Power and the Control of American Intelligence', Intelligence and National 
Security vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), p.l75.
Howard J. Wiarda, op. cit., pp. TID-IA.
Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995), p.91.
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members of the NSC are the President, the vice-president, and the secretaries of state and 
defense. Military advisor to the NSC is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 
intelligence advisor is the director of central intelligence. The NSC's staff of analysts is 
directed by the assistant to the President for national security affairs (or national security 
advisor).
4.3.3. The National Intelligence Council (NIC);
The National Intelligence Council, managed by a chairman and a vice chairman, is 
comprised of National Intelligence Officers-senior experts drawn from all elements of 
the community and from outside the government. The National Intelligence Officers 
concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and 
of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation. They serve 
the DCl in his role as leader of the intelligence community by providing a center for mid­
term and long-term strategic thinking and production. Through routine close contact with 
policymakers, collection, research, and community analysis, the NIC provides the DCI 
with the information he needs to assist policymakers as they pursue shifting interests and 
foreign policy priorities. The NIC also draws on non-governmental experts in academia 
and the private sector to bring in fresh perspectives and analytic methods to enhance the 
intelligence process. Finally, the NIC assists the intelligence community by evaluating
Sam C. Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 103.
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the adequacy of intelligence support and works with the community's functional
managers to refine strategies to meet the most crucial needs of senior consumers.87
4.3.5. The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB): The NFIB is responsible for 
approving all National Intelligence Estimates for coordinating interagency intelligence 
exchanges and the numerous bilateral relationships with foreign nations that share 
intelligence with the United States, and for developing policy for the protection of 
intelligence sources and methods.**
4.4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE US SYSTEM:
The US intelligence system is similar to the British intelligence system. They both have 
separate organizations for foreign, signal, military and security intelligence. As is the case 
in the UK, US intelligence agencies are subject to external oversight. The necessary 
establishments also warrant close relationships between policy-making and intelligence in 
the US system. This pattern of intelligence structure is adapted by many leading states of 
the world, such as Germany, France, Canada, Australia and more recently the Russian 
Federation.*^
As shown in table 4.2. The intelligence collection in the US system is performed 
by separate organizations. This is particularly important since each of the collection areas 
requires great attention and expertise. Oversight of the intelligence agencies provides
Preparing for the 21” Century; An Appraisal of US Intelligence, March 1996, 
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Charles D. Ameringer, U.S. Foreign Inlelligence, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), p.361.
For more information on states' intelligence structures visit the web site o f the Federation of American 
Scientists, the intelligence resources program. htlp:/Avww.fas.org/irp/
58
agencies with policy guidance and feedback. The intelligence community is also given 
significant place within the policy-making structure.
Collection
C e n t r a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y
D e f e n s e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  A g e n c y
F e d e r a l  B u r e a u  o f  I n v e s t i g a t i o n
P r e s i d e n t ’s  F o r e i g n  I n t e l l i g e n c e  A d v i s o r y  B o a r d
O ve rsigh t and 
A ccounta bility
P r e s i d e n t ’s  I n t e l l i g e n c e  O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d
O f f i c e  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  B u d g e t
S e n a t e  S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n t e l l i g e n c e
H o u s e  P e r m a n e n t  S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n t e l l i g e n c e
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l
Coordination
N a t i o n a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  C o u n c i l
N a t i o n a l  F o r e i g n  I n t e l l i g e n c e  B o a r d
Tabic 4.2, The U.S. Intelligence EstablishnienTs in Relation to Collection, Oversight and
Coordination
Declassified Successes:
Covert A di on in foreign policy implementation: The U.S. may be the one of the few 
countries who uses covert action excessively. Not only in wartime, which provides a 
legitimate ground to conduct covert action, but also in peacetime, may be more than 
wartime, covert action has become an irresistible tool of foreign policy conduct.^ ^  ^
Moreover, the Iran-Contra Committee of U.S. Senate noted in its report that “peacetime 
covert action became an instrument of US foreign policy following the WW
Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secrets Wars o f the CIA 1981-1987, (New York: Pocket Books, 1988).
This book provides important and detailed information on covert actions conducted by U.S. policy-makers 
in foreign policy.
Stephen Knot,’Executive Power and the Control of American Intelligence', Intelligence and National 
Security vol. 13 no. 2 (Summer 1998), p.l72.
59
CIA has long been associated with the overthrow of governments and the 
installation of military regimes. Examples include the unseating of Mossadegh in Iran in 
1953, the overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz in 1954, the failed invasion of Cuba 
in 1961, and the toppling of Chilean President Allende in 1973. There can be several 
reasons of using covert action. It may even change from government to government and 
from state to state. As for the U.S., among several government-financed intelligence 
reports, the report that was prepared by the Brookings Institution concludes on foreign 
action as follows:
The United States should consider covert action as one of its instruments of 
foreign policy. We have become conditioned to accept the use of military 
force to change situations that are unacceptable to us. Why should we be so 
reluctant to use political action or clandestine military support to affect 
change if our policy is clearly defined and our interest fully identified? 
Supporting a political group that is tiying to change its country's 
government or policies or trying to replace a bad leader is in our interests.
Using information 3/4 or, if you wish, propaganda 3/4 to change the 
behavior of a government while concealing the hand of the United States is 
better option than sending the F-16s or the Marines. Obviously, covert 
action requires special attention from the policymaker and must be part of 
an overall policy. It should not be a last resort after all else has failed...
Post Cold War Successes: A report prepared for the U.S. Congress on the future of the 
American intelligence community gives the following declassified intelligence successes 
while justifying the existence of the intelligence community; U.S. intelligence uncovered 
the first evidence suggesting that North Korea was planning to construct a nuclear 
weapons capability and supported the subsequent diplomatic efforts to restrain and end 
such activities. In at least two cases, with the help of U.S. intelligence, the sale of 
radioactive materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons was halted
7/3 From the Cold' Report of a Task Force on (he fuUire of US Intelligence funded by TwentieUi Century 
Fund, http://epn.org/tcf/intel.html
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by other governments. Since 1990, U S. intelligence has uncovered the clandestine efforts 
of several countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. 
In some cases, this information provided the basis for diplomatic actions by the United 
States and by the United Nations to counter such efforts. U.S. intelligence played a 
crucial role in supporting U.S. combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf by 
collecting information on the size, capabilities and location of hostile forces, providing 
information which permitted the targeting of precision-guided weapons, assessing the 
damage inflicted by U.S. and allied aircraft, and warning of threats to the security of U.S. 
and allied forces. The deployment of U.S. military forces to Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and 
Bosnia to perform other than combat missions similarly received the vigorous support of 
intelligence agencies, which provided information on threats to the security of U.S. forces 
as well as on local conditions. U.S. intelligence played a key role in the rescue of the 
downed American pilot in Bosnia. U.S. intelligence provided support, which was a key to 
the U.S. side in numerous bilateral and multilateral negotiations. U.S. intelligence has 
played an instrumental role in the efforts of the Colombian government to break up the 
Cali drug cartel, including the arrest and/or capture of its leaders, and, in other cases, 
provided information which kept drug shipments from reaching the United States. U.S. 
intelligence played key roles in helping other countries identify and/or airest several 
notorious terrorists, including Carlos the Jackal in Sudan, the alleged ringleader of the 
World Trade Center bombing in the Phillippines, the head of the Shining Path terrorist 
group in Peru, and those involved in the bombing of Pan Am 103. On at least two 
occasions, U.S. intelligence provided information that led to successful U.S. diplomatic 
efforts to head off potential armed conflicts between two countries. Information was
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provided by U.S. intelligence on two occasions which foiled assassination plots abroad 
and led to the arrest of the perpetrators. In several instances, U.S. intelligence uncovered 
foreign competitors of U.S. commercial firms using bribery and other illegal tactics to 
obtain contracts with foreign governments. Diplomatic intervention with the government 
concerned to assure a "level playing field" eventually led to a U.S. firm obtaining the 
contract by winning the competition. U.S. intelligence has identified violations of 
military and trade sanctions imposed by the United Nations in connection with the 
situations in Iraq and Bosnia, and provided the principal capability for monitoring the 
"no-fly" zones in both countries. On several occasions, U.S. intelligence provided 
information warning of financial collapse in other countries, leading to actions by the 
United States and other governments. U.S. intelligence provided information with respect 
to human rights abuses and election-rigging by certain governments which altered the 
U.S. diplomatic posture towards those governments. U.S. intelligence provided 
information about the military capabilities of other governments that altered the research 
and development of U.S. weapons systems, providing potential cost savings and 
improving their effectiveness. U.S. intelligence provided information to civil authorities 
in the United States, as w'ell as in other countries, to help cope with natural disasters, 
environmental problems, and humanitarian crises. U.S. intelligence has supported United 
Nations' peacekeeping and other operations around the world. Considerable information 
has been provided by U.S. intelligence to the Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal.
”  Preparing for the 2 f  Century: An Appraisal o f US Intelligence, March 1996, 
hltp://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/repon.html
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Conclusion:
Like the British intelligence community, the US intelligence community has developed 
through the major wars and political events of this century. The UK-US close 
cooperation on intelligence has brought a common standard on intelligence for the 
democratic and strong states of the west. British intelligence carried the intelligence 
burden for the allies in the WW I and WW II, in return the US intelligence community 
did same thing during the Cold War. Winning the Cold War without firing even one 
bullet is enough to prove how successful the US intelligence community has been.
The major wars and political events gave the chance to the US and to UK to test 
and develop their intelligence apparatus. Therefore their system is widely adapted by 
other western states.
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CHAPTER 5 - THE TURKISH SYSTEM
5.1. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN TURKEY:
By law the primary responsibility for collecting, analyzing and reporting security and 
foreign intelligence rests with the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). There are 
also departmental intelligence units/agencies. The National Police, the Military and the 
Gendarme have their own intelligence apparatus to perform related duties. Unlike the 
U.S. and U.K., there is no separate technical and foreign intelligence collection agency. 
Collection of electronic intelligence is carried out both by MIT and Military electronic 
intelligence units.^“* Collection of foreign intelligence is performed by MIT, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs(MFA) (not in professional terms), and Military -  to some extent. The 
General Secretariat of the National Security Council is the main consumer of the finished 
intelligence.
National Intelligence 
Organization 
MIT
National Police 
Intelligence
Gendarmerie
Intelligence
Military
Intelligence
Strategic/Foreign
Intelligence X
Security Intelligence 
(Domestic) X X X X
Criminal Intelligence
X
Signal Intelligence 
(Foreign) X X
Economic Intelligence
Table 5.1 Intelligence Collection in the Turkish System
5.1.1. The National Intelligence Organization (MİT)
The Law numbered 2937 embodies the guiding principles governing the production and
Fanik Bildirici, GizU Kulaklar Ülkesi, (Islaabul; Ilclişirn Yayınlan, 1998), p. 19-259. This book is the 
first open source on security electronic intelligence activities of the Turkish Intelligence Community.
64
utilization of national intelligence; as well as the structure, duties and responsibilities of 
the National Intelligence Organization. While the Law Numbered 644 was entitled as the 
"Statute of the National Intelligence Organization", the Law Numbered 2937 amends it as 
the "Statute of the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence 
Organization".
MIT Undersecretary is responsible to the Prime Minister. The designation of the 
MIT Undersecretary is first discussed at the National Security Council, then proposed by 
the Prime Minister, and finally approved by the President of the Republic. By the Law 
numbered 2937 The MIT is authorized to produce statewide national security intelligence 
relevant to the internal and/or external activities, actual or potential, that may be 
detrimental to the Republic of Turkey. The intelligence produced by MIT is submitted to 
the President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, Secretary 
General of the National Security Council, and to other relevant authorities, as may be 
required.
The MIT submits proposals, relevant to the management of the intelligence 
function of the public establishments and institutions, to the National Security Council 
and to the Prime Minister. The MIT is also authorized to offer intelligence and counter­
intelligence expertise to the public institutions on security matters within their respective 
jurisdiction, and may coordinate such activities. In addition to the above duties defined by 
the Law, the MIT may be called up on to assume additional responsibilities pursuant to 
the National Security Council decisions.
95 MIT's official web site http://www.mit.gov.tr/
65
Counter-intelligence includes prevention of the activities of foreign intelligence 
services in Turkey, supporting the counter-espionage efforts of the public institutions, 
and executing counter measures for psychological threats posed against Turkey.
The current MIT statute, that is, the Law Numbered 2937, forbids involvement or 
orientation of the MIT in pursuit of objectives other than intelligence services relevant to 
the security of the State as prescribed above. The MIT is authorized to benefit from the 
archives and Electronic Data Processing (EDP) centers of the Ministries and other public 
institutions on matters relevant to its terms of reference.
Figure 5.2. Structure of the MIT
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Structure of the MIT ; The Undersecretariat of National Intelligence Organization is 
comprised of the Office of the Undersecretary, the Offices of the Deputy 
Undersecretaries, Directorates, Divisions, and Branches and other units. The central and 
provincial organizations are regulated and managed through standing and ad hoc 
directives. The MIT is organized in the form of Principal Services, Advisory Groups and 
Auxiliary Service Unites, as well as internal and external organizations, which are 
maintained depending on the exigencies. Beside the Central Organization of the MIT, 
there are the Domestic Intelligence Gathering Centers and the MIT Residencies abroad.
5.1.2. The National Police Intelligence:
The National Police are responsible to maintain law and order in urban areas. Among its 
duties National Police Intelligence Units collect intelligence on criminal and terrorist 
activities. Police intelligence mainly deals with matters of state security, organized crime, 
smuggling and other criminal issues. The National Police is organized in every city and it 
has intelligence departments along with other police departments in every province of 
T u r k e y . A  general director who is responsible to the Minister of Intemal Affairs 
commands the National Police.
5.1.3. Military Intelligence;
Turkey has relatively strong armed forces. However it is hard to claim that the ability of 
military intelligence matches that big military power. The Turkish armed forces are 
organized in a highly centralized command structure unlike the American and British
96 Bekir Çınar, Devlet Güvenliği, İstihbarat ve Terör, (Ankara: Sam Yayınlan, 1997), pp. 172-174,
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military forces. Army, Navy and Air Forces are commanded by a four star general each 
and all three forces is responsible to the Chief of General Staff. Each force has its 
own intelligence structure. There is also a strong intelligence cadre within Headquarters 
of the Turkish General Staff that coordinates, plans and analyzes the intelligence 
activities of the armed forces. Armed Forces intelligence School is subordinated to 
Headquarters of the General Staff.
5.1.4. Gendarme Intelligence:
Turkish Gendarme is a security force in a military structure that maintains law and order 
in rural areas. Commanded by a four star general, the gendarme serves under the Minister 
of Interior Affairs. Gendarme forces maintain a strong intelligence structure to support its 
combat against terrorism and organized crime. Like the police forces. Gendarme has 
intelligence units along with other departments in every city of Turkey.
5.2. OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILTY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The law numbered 2937 "Statute of the State Intelligence Services and the National 
Intelligence Organization" does not provide an oversight agency independent from the 
chain of command. There is no external oversight, control or performance review agency 
over the intelligence community. There are numerous committee and commissions within 
the structure of the Turkish Parliament. But none of them is related to intelligence. Thus 
intelligence community in Turkey, except for its internal control mechanism, is not 
overseen.
’’ Bekir Cinar, Devlet Güvenliği, İstihbarat ve Terör, (Ankara: Sam Yayinlari), 1997, pp. 170-172.
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5.3. COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY MAKING:
5.3.1. The National Security Council: According to article 118 of the Constitution, NSC 
has ten members. The President of the Turkish Republic is head of the NSC. The 
remaining nine members are the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Internal 
Affairs, National Defense, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Commanders of Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie. The council makes decisions by majority vote. The 
council is responsible for the formulation of the policy for the security of the state and for 
taking decisions and applications, as well as for presenting to the Council of Ministers its 
views related on how the necessary coordination can be carried out. It mainly deals with 
national security matters, internal and external threats. According to the constitution the 
NSC advises the government on national security matters. The decisions taken by the 
NSC has to be considered by the government in the decision-making process.^*
5.3.2. General Secretariat of the National Security Council: The Secretariat is vested 
with the responsibility of carrying out surveys, research and investigations into matters 
related to the duties of the Security Council, and to present its conclusions and proposals 
to the Council. The secretariat sets all the intelligence requirements and priorities.
5.3.3. National Intelligence Coordination Committee; Military and civil intelligence 
requirements are formulated by the National Intelligence Coordination Committee. This 
committee includes members from the staff of the National Security Council, to which it 
is directly responsible. The constitution of the National Intelligence Coordination Board
98
A. Şeref Gözübüjâik, Türkiyeuin İdari Yapısı, (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi yayınlan, 1995), p. 56.
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(MIKK), established with the Law Numbered 644 of 1965, has been carried over to the 
Law Numbered 2937 without any alteration. The MIKK is authorized to maintain 
coordination among the public offices in intelligence gathering efforts, and to formulate 
recommendations in directing the same.
Figure 5.2. Intelligence in process while making policy
As depicted in figure 5.2., MIT provides intelligence to the NSC and the Council of 
Ministers. Since the elected government is ultimately held responsible for policy making 
and implementing, it takes into consideration recommendations given by NSC and 
intelligence inputs provided by the MIT. This is the formal process defined by the 
constitution and law.
99 Tuncay Özkan Gizli Servisin Tarihi: MIT, (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Kitapları, 1996), p. 277.
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CHAPTER 6 - COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS
6.1. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.K.-U.S.A. AND THE 
TURKISH SYSTEMS:
6.1.1. Structure of the Intelligence Communities
The world’s intelligence, espionage, and covert action programs may be said to follow 
three distinct organizational patterns; the American, the Soviet (totalitarian), and the 
British (parliamentary) systems.’”’’ Similarities exist among them yet distinctions are 
sharp. In the U.S. "intelligence agencies were shaped by individuals who understood the 
mechanics of totalitarianism and wanted none of it here".'”' Most countries have a tightly 
contained and hierarchically organized intelligence service. In the United States, 
however, pluralism - that is, multiple centers of power- characterizing its political system 
is reflected in its intelligence community as well. Competition within the community 
leads to a wider array of collection operations, sharpens minds, keeps the analysts honest, 
allows policy-makers a better sense of options and most importantly, offers vital 
safeguards against a concentration of power that could evolve into the creation of a secret 
police.'”^  "Combining domestic and foreign intelligence functions creates the possibility 
that domestic law enforcement will be infected by the secrecy, deception, and 
ruthlessness that international espionage requires. Dividing the responsibilities among 
different agencies reduces that risk..."'”^  It is surely no accident that the Russian
Suat İlhan, ‘istihbarat: Gizil Güç'.Strateji no. 95/3, p.90.
Stewart A. Baker, 'Should Spies Be Cops?', Foreign Policy no. 97, (Winter 1994 - 95) p. 36.
Loch K. Johnson, ‘Strategic Intelligence: An American Perspective’, in A. Stuart Parson (ed.) Security 
and Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p.52.
Stewart A. Bakcr,op.cit., p. 37.
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democrats who helped break up the Soviet Union also stripped the KGB of its internal 
security duties-adopting, in essence, an American system of divided responsibility.'”''
In the U.S. the CIA continues to sit at the corner of an elaborate complex of some 
dozen separate intelligence organizations. Each has a specific role and a caretlilly 
guarded area of operations. The director of central intelligence is both head of the CIA 
and the President’s principal intelligence adviser. In the latter job, the director 
theoretically coordinates all the separate intelligence units, setting their requirements, 
budgets, and operational assignments. In reality many of the major units in the system- 
such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency/Central 
Security Service, both parts of the Department of Defense- operate in quasi 
independence. The National Security Agency, which engages in code breaking and code 
making, is much larger in staff size and budget than the CIA. The military also maintains 
a major tactical intelligence capability to assist field commanders in making on the spot 
decisions. Other major units in the U.S. intelligence system includes the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of Treasury, the FBI, 
and the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice. The American 
model influenced the intelligence structures of those countries where the U.S.A. was 
dominant at the end of WWII, such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
In contrast to the federated American intelligence structure, the typical totalitarian 
setup is highly centralized. In the Soviet Union, for example, the power of the KGB 
pervaded every aspect of national life. Its director was generally a powerful member of 
the Politburo (the governing political committee of the USSR). The KGB had two chief 
directories. The most important was the First Directorate, which was responsible for
lOd
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foreign intelligence gathering. The Second Directorate’s principal responsibilities 
involved providing counterespionage protection to the regime and recuiriting foreign 
agents within the Soviet U n i o n . M o s t  Eastern European governments followed the 
KGB model in their intelligence operations. China, Cuba, and many Middle East 
countries such as Syria and Iraq still do.
The third model of intelligence systems is the British, a confederation of agencies 
coordinated by a cabinet subcommittee and accountable to the cabinet and prime 
minister. The two principal units are the Secret Intelligence Service and the Security 
Service. With some national variations, the intelligence services of France, Italy, Israel, 
and the members of Commonwealth of Nations follow the British pattern of 
organization.'“^
The Turkish Intelligence System is somewhere between the British and the Soviet 
systems. The regime is a parliamentary democratic regime. Every function of the 
government is closely watched by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In this 
respect the system looks like the British (parliamentary) system. However, an exception 
is made within the parliamentary system for the national security organizations and 
consequently for the National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Unlike the British system, 
MIT is accountable to the Prime Minister. MIT combines security and foreign 
intelligence in one hand. There exists no independent or parliamentaiy oversight over 
MIT.
105 John J. Dziak, ‘The Soviet System of Security and Intelligence’, in A. Stuart Parson (ed.) Security and 
Intelligence In A Changing World: New Perspectives For The 1990s (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 25- 
45.
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6.1.2. The Place Given to Foreign Intelligence within the Intelligence Community:
For a strong foreign policy-making and implementation there is a great need for 
intelligence apparatus. The U.S.A. and the U.K. have given significant importance to 
foreign/strategic intelligence within their intelligence communities. In the U.S.A., while 
CIA gathers and analyzes foreign human intelligence, the NSA provides technical foreign 
intelligence. In the U.K. a system similar to the one in the U.S. exists. Secret Intelligence 
Agency (SIS) provides foreign human intelligence and conducts covert operations, 
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) collects and analyzes foreign signals 
intelligence. Both countries have separate security intelligence organizations to deal with 
internal threats and counterintelligence activities.
SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE
FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNICATION 
/ELECTRONIC INT.
US F in
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
NSA
National Security Agency
UK SS
Security Service
SIS
Secret Intelligence Service
GCHQ
Government Communication 
Headquarters
Turkey M IT
Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı
Tabic 6.1. Intcllii'cncc Agencies
Unlike most of its allies and competitors, Turkey does not have an agency 
dedicated to gathering solely foreign intelligence. More specifically, Turkey does not 
have the equivalent of the United States' Central Intelligence Agency or the United 
Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service.
In Turkey the whole intelligence activities are conducted under one organization. 
MIT is held responsible for all kinds of intelligence collection and analysis. Naturally this 
causes big gaps between the actual need and provision of foreign intelligence. If there had
106 Michael Herman, op. cil., pp.24, 226.
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been a separate foreign/strategic intelligence organization, Turkey would have been much 
more successful in making and implementing foreign policy. The seriousness of internal 
threats and the issue of terrorism have led MIT to assign number one priority to domestic 
security matters. Thus all intelligence activities have been shaped by domestic security 
concerns. In fact, a separate foreign intelligence organization that is independent of all 
domestic issues and concerns would contribute much to Turkey’s national interests. As 
noted earlier, domestic and foreign intelligence are the assigned responsibilities of MIT, 
whereas in most developed countries these tasks are usually divided between separate 
agencies. In its current form, MIT is a typical security intelligence agency, just like the 
UK’s Security Service (MI 6) which gathers security intelligence within and outside of 
the UK or America’s FBI.
What about political, economic, technologic, intelligence and assessment on 
foreign matters? Who is going to meet the need for foreign/strategic intelligence? As 
noted by a diplomat, “Turkey is not successful in gathering foreign intelligence.” ' ”^  In 
fact there has been a heavy dependence on Western allies in foreign intelligence. 
Therefore, Turkey needs new strategic intelligence concepts, plans, personnel and 
organization before entering the new millennium.'”*
6.1.3. Oversight and Accountability of the Intelligence Community:
For the public, one of the most troubling aspects of intelligence activities is their 
perceived lack of accountability. Operating in secrecy, intelligence agencies are seen not
Kainran tnan, Di ·^ Politika (Ankara; Ölüken Yayınlan, 1994), p.26.
Mehmet Atay, 'Stratejik Ulusal Güvenlik İstihbaratı', Strateji no: 96/1, pp. 91-92.
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simply as mysterious, but often uncontrolled. Compared with the other institutions of the 
government, intelligence agencies pose unique difficulties when it comes to providing 
accountability. They cannot disclose their activities to the public without disclosing them 
to their targets at the same time. As a result, intelligence agencies are not subject to the 
same rigors of public or congressional/parliamentary debate or the same scrutiny by the 
media as other government agencies. Their budgets are secret; their operations are secret; 
their assessments are secret.
Congressional/Parliamentary Oversight Executive Oversight
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
U.S.
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI)
President's Foreign 
Advisory Board (PFIAB)
Intelligence
Other Committees
President's Intelligence Oversight Board 
(iOB)
Office of Management and Budget 
(0M B)________________________________
UK The Intelligence and Security Committee Commissioners
CANADA The Security and Intelligence and Review Committee 
(S IR C )___________________________________________
Commissioners
AUSTRALIA Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO
Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security___________________________
Security Appeals Tribunal
TURKEY NONE NONE
Tabic 6.2. External Oversight of the Intelligence Agencies
Intelligence agencies, however, are institutions within a democratic form of 
government, responsible not only to the President/Prime Minister, but to the elected 
representatives of the people, and, ultimately, to the people themselves. They are handed 
by the taxpayers.
To solve this dilemma, special oversight arrangements for intelligence have been 
established within the Executive and Legislative branches of the USA and the UK. As 
shown in table 6.2., both the UK and the US intelligence communities are subject to
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external oversight from the Executive and Legislative branches. In US, for example, in 
the Congress, special committees in each House are charged with the oversight function, 
serving as surrogates for their respective bodies and for the public as well. Within the 
Executive branch. Inspectors General have been established within the agencies 
themselves or within their parent organizations. The White House also has an intelligence 
oversight office. Because of the need for secrecy, these bodies normally carry out their 
oversight functions in private, reporting as necessary and appropriate to the public 
without exposing the intelligence activities they are overseeing.
In Turkey, however, there is no such external oversight from either Legislative or 
Executive branches. Therefore the quality, quantity and adequacy of intelligence 
collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and other functions of the Turkish intelligence 
community cannot be assessed. Consequently there is no feedback to improve the system 
to the level of contemporary intelligence services.
6.1.4. Coordinating Intelligence and Policy Making:
Intelligence agencies cannot operate in a vacuum. Like any other service organization, 
intelligence agencies must have guidance from the people they serve. They exist as a tool 
of government to gather and assess information, and if they do not receive direction, 
chances are greater that resources will be misdirected and wasted. Intelligence agencies 
need to know what information to collect and when it is needed. They need to know if 
their products are useful and how they might be improved to better serve policymakers. 
Guidance must come from the top. Policymaker direction should be both the foundation 
and the catalyst for the work of the Intelligence Community.
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As stated previously, the intelligence community does not exist for its own sake. 
The community, like other organs of state, has certain functions to fulfill. The 
intelligence community is not above the importance of proper coordination. A well 
planned, laid out and prioritized intelligence requirement will guide the intelligence 
community and will, in return, provide clear cut information that policy makers need.
In Turkey, although there are necessary organizations, some believe that this 
coordination function doesn’t work properly.M oreover, the Adviser to the President 
on security and intelligence urges that a new intelligence coordination system should be
created no
6.2. CONCLUSION:
Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was typically insular and passive. 
Turkey focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions 
that could divert it from that goal. Therefore Turkey did not need to collect foreign 
intelligence in any significant way. Instead it heavily relied on intelligence provided by 
NATO states.
After the Cold War Turkey started to follow a rather activist foreign policy. The 
reasons for Turkey’s greater assertiveness are various and overlapping: more prosperity a 
better-equipped and more experienced military, the decline of neighboring states, greater 
regional opportunity, and a greater sense of policy interdependence marked by the ending 
of restraints imposed by the Cold War.
Mehmet Eymür, y4/7a//z.· Bir MİTMensuhııntın Anıları, (İslîinbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Yayınları, 
1991), p. 42, Tuncay Özkan, Bir Gizli Servisin Tarihi: MIT, (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, Milliyet Kitapları, 
1996), pp. 276-27., Suat İlhan, ‘istihbarat: Gizil Güç’, Strateji no. 95/3, p.88.
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Since 1993, Turkish forces have participated in numerous peacekeeping, peace­
monitoring, and related operations, in Somalia, Bosnia, Albania, Georgia, Hebron, 
Kuwait (the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission), Macedonia, and Pakistan (training 
Afghan refugees on mine clearing). As a result of another Turkish initiative. Several 
Balkan states agreed in September 1998 to set up a Balkan peacekeeping force to be 
deployed in NATO or WEU led operations sanctioned by the UN or the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey also proposed a similar force for the 
Caucasus and a naval peacekeeping force for the Black Sea. In the Balkans, Turkey 
established working relations with all the states of the region. It developed close ties with 
Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia. Disintegration of Soviet Union let Turkey exploit 
opportunities in the region. It has developed close ties with the Turkic States of the 
former Soviet Union.
Turkey needs to have an intelligence agency which provides necessary 
intelligence in formulating (and sometimes in implementing) its foreign, economic and 
military policies. Turkey cannot expect a continuation of the generous intelligence­
sharing of past. Turkish Intelligence Community needs a strong foreign intelligence 
agency. MIT and other intelligence agencies might continue with their security 
intelligence work, or even it can be increased as the circumstances dictate. However, 
nothing will match or fulfill the foreign intelligence requirements that are essential to 
pursue an effective foreign policy. MIT is considered as an agency that also produces 
strategic/foreign intelligence as well as security intelligence. In fact, by the time MIT has 
become a security intelligence agency like Germany's BfV, United States' FBI, Great
110 Mehmet Atay, 'Stratejik Ulusal Güvenlik istihbaratı'. Strateji no: 96/1, p. 92.
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Britain's MIS. These are security intelligence agencies gathering intelligence and 
conducting operations mainly in their homeland as well as abroad. In Turkey there are 
four intelligence units collecting security intelligence, whereas only a branch of MIT is 
gathering foreign intelligence. Even foreign intelligence collection is tasked for security 
concerns.
Turkey’s internal and external security concerns dictate having a strong security 
intelligence organization. In recent years Turkish security forces made a successful 
struggle against terrorist activities. Intelligence surely had a big share in this success. 
Turkey, however, needs equally a strong foreign intelligence agency to deal with its near 
abroad, to protect the rights of the Turks living abroad, to detect early, emerging threats 
to the Turkish National Interests (not only to the Turkish National Security) in wherever 
on the globe, to protect the rights of Turkish firms and businessmen that are increasingly 
engaging with international contracts, to provide strong and accurate intelligence 
estimates for the planing of foreign policy.
A tradition of external and independent oversight and performance review should 
be initiated within the Turkish system. This is not only a prerequisite of a democratic 
republic, but also one of the essentials of maintaining a strong national security structure.
Another important element of the modern intelligence communities that is not 
acknowledged within the Turkish system is a separate Electronic intelligence gathering 
agency. NS A (National Security Agency) in the U.S., GCHQ (Government 
Communications Headquarters) in the U.K., CSE (Communications Security 
Establishment) in Canada are the examples of such agencies that collect foreign signals 
intelligence and conduct high-tech intelligence operations.
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While setting priorities in intelligence collection, security is given number one 
priority. NSC, which has a great role in directing and setting intelligence goals, mainly 
deals with security matters. Decisions taken by the Council usually do not include 
economic, foreign and political and technical intelligence matters.
Contribution from non-governmental sources such as academia and institutes into 
the Turkish intelligence community is virtually none. Thus, fresh analysis and brains is 
prevented contributing to the system.
To sum, Turkish Intelligence Community should be reformed in order to 
encompass the following missions effectively:
1. Support to Turkish diplomacy
2. Support to monitoring of treaties and other agreements
3. Support to military operations
4. Support to defense planning
5. Economic Intelligence
6. Countering activities abroad that threaten Turkey's interests.
7. Support to criminal justice and regulatory agencies
8. Collecting and analyzing environmental information
9. Support to “Information Warfare”" '
"Information Warfare" refers to activities undertaken by governments, groups or individuals to gain 
electronic access to information systems, manipulating or fabricating data, or perhaps even bringing the 
systems down, as well as activities undertaken to protect against such activities. In Turkey, govermnenl and 
public communications, transportation, financial, energy, and other industrial systems have become 
critically dependent on a complex set of interconnected automated information and control sj'stems. Many 
of these systems arc potentially vulnerable to computer-based disruption, manipulation, or corruption by 
hostile individuals, groups, or countries. Turkey, therefore, urgently needs an “information warfare” 
concept and emergency plans.
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It is obvious that a centralized intelligence agency like MIT can not 
perform all above- mentioned missions effectively. Therefore a reform for Turkish 
intelligence system is inevitable.
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